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A RESPONSIBILITY TO SPEAK: 
CITIZENS UNITED, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGING RISKS 
 
Roger Coffin* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The highly publicized ruling of the United States Supreme Court in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission1 removed a critical barrier 
to corporate spending in federal elections.  The decision was controversial 
when decided, and remains so today.2  This controversy stems in part from 
the tension between the role of the corporation as a public citizen, and the 
fear that corporate wealth and power will disrupt individual rights and the 
political process.  Because corporations are separate legal entities,3 they 
have an interest in and obligation to protect and advance their individual 
economic interests.  In the highly regulated environment in which most 
corporations compete, participating in the regulatory process may be 
necessary to franchise protection.  One needs only to consider the health 
care or financial reform legislation of 2010 for examples of government 
programs with far-reaching ramifications for business.  Thus, the reality for 
many corporations is that government action may have a significant effect 
on firm value.  And, of course, to participate in the regulatory process 
involves participating in political discourse. 
The empirical work presented in this article concludes that Citizens 
United and the right to corporate political speech will not damage stock 
 
* Associate Director of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of 
Delaware and an Associate Professor of the Practice at the Lerner College of Business and Economics.  
I am grateful for the assistance and guidance of Jim Cox, Charles Elson, Bruce Freed, Karl Sandstrom, 
Larry Hamermesh and Fred Bereskin.  Invaluable assistance was provided by Zeynab Mohammed and 
Nicole Phillips in research and statistical analysis.  Any flaws are, of course, my own. 
 1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2. See Bradley Smith, The Incumbent’s Bane: Citizens United and the 2010 Election, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 25, 2011, at A15 (suggesting that Citizens United is a good decision because it opens the 
political system to change, and that the decision will likely have the effect of making congressional 
races more competitive in the future). 
 3. Klein v. Bd. of Tax Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930). 
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prices, contrary to previous assumptions.  The decision in Citizens United 
(and the ability to engage in corporate political speech) does not appear to 
negatively affect firm market value.  This represents good news for both 
shareholders and public companies.  This article creates an event study for 
the dates around the decision, dates close to the November 2010 mid-term 
election, and the election itself.  Sampling various industry indexes, 
together with selected company stocks (which, based on public 
information, were known or likely to be perceived by the market as 
engaging in political speech), the research herein does not find support for 
concluding political spending is harmful to shareholders.  Also selected 
were companies that, after the Citizens United decision, publicly pledged 
not to engage in corporate political speech.  The market values of these 
stocks did not go up post-announcement, suggesting no market reward for 
foregoing a right to speak.  Although subject to the limitations of exogenity 
inherent in event studies, this research casts new light on the topic and adds 
to the body of academic literature by suggesting that Citizens United and 
corporate political speech is a nonfactor in the financial markets.  These 
findings are consistent with the legal context of the case, which is, despite 
media coverage presenting Citizens United as drastic, more of an 
incremental advance than a major change in constitutional law as applied to 
corporations.  Policy makers and reformers seeking additional restrictions 
on speech post-Citizens United should consider these findings in balancing 
free speech rights against perceived corporate governance issues relating to 
shareholder voting rights. 
Moreover, in placing the First Amendment rights of corporations into 
a corporate governance framework, commentators have focused on the role 
of the shareholder.4  Specifically, the issue of protection of shareholder 
rights in the event a corporation takes a political position has been 
highlighted, with some academics and policymakers suggesting 
shareholders be given enhanced sovereignty rights through corporate 
governance mechanisms.5  These proposals include the ability to make 
binding shareholder resolutions, the right to prior approvals and control 
over budgeting, and the adoption of federal corporate governance codes 
which would explicitly vest political speech power in the hands of 
shareholders as opposed to the board or management.6 
 
 4. Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility 13–14 (History of Corporate 
Responsibility Project, Working Paper No. 6, 2011), available at http://www.cebcglobal.org/uploaded 
_files/Corporate_Law_and_History_of_CR_-_Johnson_working_paper_-_final.pdf. 
 5. See generally Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833 (2005). 
 6. See Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech, Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV., 83, 97–111 (forthcoming 2011), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/ 
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This article argues that these proposals are unnecessary, impractical 
and potentially damaging.  As this article contends, and as others have 
likewise recognized, the modern era of corporate governance is 
characterized by an increase in shareholder rights.7  The ability of 
shareholders, acting individually or in groups, to influence the corporation 
is at its zenith.  New mechanisms, including changes to the director 
nominating process, say-on-pay, elimination of broker voting, reduction of 
staggered boards and plurality voting, give the modern shareholder a louder 
voice than the shareholder of a generation ago. 
Additionally, unlike categories of transactions in which the economic 
interests of a minority of shareholders may be damaged by the actions of 
the majority, corporate political speech is not undertaken on behalf of a 
certain group of shareholders versus another.  It is made on behalf of the 
entire corporation.  Corporate political spending, when undertaken by 
boards of directors properly discharging their fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty and its associated element of good faith, should be directed at 
maximizing the long-term value of the firm, and thus be in alignment with 
shareholders’ economic interests. 
Nor does corporate political activity impinge upon a shareholder’s 
ability to exercise his or her own political beliefs.  Corporations are citizens 
in public life; their footprint is manifested to the public through the way the 
company presents itself in its advertising and branding, labor practices, 
employee relations and charitable contributions.  Any and all of these 
activities may conflict with, offend or run contra to the personal beliefs 
and/or preferences of shareholders.  None of these activities are illegal in 
and of themselves, and all are generally undertaken by the corporate form 
in good faith and with the corporate purpose in mind.  In this sense, a 
shareholder’s political beliefs are as unimportant to the primary goal of a 
corporation as are the shareholder’s tastes in other personal items, such as 
art, movies or clothing.  To believe otherwise opens the lid on shareholder 
and stakeholder derivative interests, none of which should assume, on 
balance, primacy over the First Amendment right of the corporation.  Tying 
the corporate hands with these interests would be tantamount to stripping 
the right to speak from the firm, which Citizens United makes clear is 
prohibited by the Constitution.  Corporate governance should not be 
allowed to do what direct legislation is prohibited from doing—suppress 
the right of an association of persons to speak. 
 
media/pdf/vol_12401bebchuk_jackson.pdf. 
 7. See John J. Madden, The Shifting Landscape of Corporate Governance, and Four Steps Boards 
Should Take in an Era of Shareholder Ascendency, BNA, INC. CORP. GOVERNANCE REP., Feb. 7, 2011, 
at 1–2. 
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Nonetheless, concerns over whether corporate speech and shareholder 
beliefs should be in harmony raise governance questions, mainly around 
what should be done in the event that corporate speech and shareholder 
views conflict.  Citizens United was decided, in part, on reliance upon the 
theory that protection of potentially dissenting shareholder rights could be 
addressed through corporate governance mechanisms.  In so doing, the 
majority of the Court neglected to take into account certain realities 
inherent in the modern corporation.  If it had, it would have recognized the 
fundamental agency problems inherent in a public corporation’s ability to 
discern the political views of its existing shareholder base at any given 
point in time.  This article argues that despite these agency issues (which 
prevent the corporation from discerning shareholder political views) 
shareholder political views are outweighed by the need for the corporation 
to pursue its purpose and welfare. 
Consideration of the political speech rights of the modern corporation 
leads to another policy issue—the rights of corporations under Citizens 
United are incomplete.  Corporations are economic actors, not political 
ones.8  And although there have historically been, and today are, a growing 
number of corporations that promote and advertise their adherence to 
socially responsible investing, they do so because the corporation believes 
pursuing those policies will benefit the long-term shareholder interest.9  By 
contrast, political candidates in federal elections do not run on pure 
economic platforms.  Candidates stand for or against a diverse array of 
social, political and economic issues in the context of a campaign.  Some of 
these issues may be of greater visibility than others due to a number of 
factors, including media coverage, current events or demographic trends.  
In arriving at a personal choice, a natural person must weigh, and 
ultimately balance, the entirety of the candidate’s positions against the 
personal beliefs of that natural person.  Factors which are highly personal, 
and unique, become a part of the process a natural person makes in arriving 
 
 8. For one of the best known articulations of this theory, see Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (“there is one and 
only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits . . . .”) (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)).  See 
also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919) (standing for, accurately or not, the 
proposition that a business corporation is organized for the benefit of shareholders).  Regardless if one 
is a stakeholder or shareholder-advocacy purist, it is hoped that given the choice, most would concede 
that the primary objective of a for-profit corporation is not to exist solely for political means.  This view 
is apparently shared by most Americans.  See, e.g., Edelman Trust Barometer Survey, EDELMAN.COM 
(2010) http://www.edelman.com/trust/2010/ (finding that fifty-six percent of Americans agree with 
Friedman’s quote that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.”). 
 9. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function, 14 J. APPLIED FIN. 8, 9 (2001) (suggesting that long-term value is the corporate goal, which is 
best achieved by rewarding all stakeholders appropriately). 
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at a decision to support a particular candidate.  Corporations are not suited 
to engage in the deliberation of multiple factors in arriving at a political 
speech decision.  They do not normally have a personal belief set akin to 
that of a natural person.10  Consequently, applying a purely economic focus 
to a multidimensional issue may cause unintended consequences for the 
corporation and may damage shareholder value.11 
It has also been argued that there exists a potential agency problem if 
the corporation’s managers substitute their own personal beliefs for those 
of the corporation.12  This risk is not unlike any other agency issue.  To the 
degree that Citizens United has the potential to introduce an agency 
problem that diminishes firm value; share prices should reflect this and 
decline.  The agency problem of the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) 
substituting his or her own beliefs for the best interests of the firm would 
bias the results herein.  The instant study, and the empirical results showing 
no harm to shareholders post-Citizens United, is solid even in the face of 
this problem.  This is not to argue that the agency issue does not exist.  
Quite the contrary, this article argues that Citizens United must be 
evaluated in the context of the rise of the institutional shareholder armed 
with a new toolkit of governance mechanisms—all of which strengthen, 
rather than weaken, board and management accountability to shareholders. 
These dangers, while real, are nonetheless outweighed by the 
corporations’ interest and need to participate in political speech. 
Corporations are created by statutes.  Governments, through statutes, 
regulate the business affairs of corporations in ways that can affect the 
strategy and economic success of the venture.  In some industries, 
government regulation can be a primary driver in decisions relating to new 
products, markets and costs.  Engaging in political speech is a risk, but a 
risk like any other facing the corporate body.  Going forward, policy 
makers, such as Congress, state legislatures, and the judiciary should make 
it explicit that a board of directors, in compliance with applicable laws 
regarding independence and subject to an election process enhanced by a 
system of proxy access or reimbursement, have the authority, and duty, to 
manage political speech. 
 
 
 
 
 10. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925–26 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 11. See James Taranto, Target Becomes One, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2010, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703309704575413430222277828.html?KEYWORDS
=Target+Becomes+One. 
 12. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312–13 (1976). 
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II.  THE NEW SHAREHOLDER-CENTRIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
Part II of this article describes the state of the modern corporate 
governance environment, which began to take form in the late 1980s and is 
still developing to this day.13  Citizens United must be evaluated within the 
framework in which it was decided, and not within the governance 
environment which existed twenty-five, fifty or one hundred years ago.  
The reality is that corporate governance is evolving at a rapid pace.  Recent 
reforms, particularly those resulting from the Dodd-Frank legislation, are 
critical to an understanding of the post-1980s corporate governance playing 
field. 
This section traces the development back to the late 1980s because it 
was at that time a number of forces came together to elevate the study of 
how corporations run themselves to matters of importance to investors, 
boards and regulators.14  Links were established between good corporate 
governance and firm performance.15  In addition, the increasing importance 
of financial intermediaries, and the ultimate dominance of the United States 
equity markets by institutional investors, changed the way shareholders 
related to the corporations in which they were invested.  One important 
aspect of the institutional investor revolution is the existence of fiduciary 
duties, which include a requirement for money managers to participate in 
the proxy and annual election process.16  Contemporary institutional 
investors are active and significant participants in shareholder elections and 
in governance matters generally.17  After that, activists, governance 
reformers and academics began to focus on the composition of the board 
itself, and the openness of the election process.  Independent directors and 
open elections became the primary means sought to restore board 
accountability to the shareholder in the 1990s and 2000s.18 
 
 13. See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 9.3 (1997). 
 14. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
783 (2009). 
 15. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 1 
(Ga. State Univ., Working Paper, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=586423. 
 16. See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, EVERYTHING YOU EVER WANTED TO KNOW 
ABOUT PROXY VOTING BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK 4–5 (2010), available at http://www.cii.org/ 
UserFiles/file/resource%20center/publications/ProxyVotingPrimer-Jan2010.pdf. 
 17. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., V.C, Del. Court of Chancery, Remarks at Stanford Law School: Lack of 
Short Term and Long Term Alignment in the Corporate Governance System (May 24, 2010) available 
at http://rockcenter.standford.edu/2010/05/24/lack-of-short-term-and-long-term-alignment-in-the-corp 
orate-governance-system/ (indicating that large institutional investors have the clout and means to attain 
their political goals in governance reform). 
 18. See Charles M. Elson, The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. 
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In the aggregate, these influences led to something else: the 
politicization of corporate governance.  As one well-known governance 
thinker said about proxy access—one of the flash points in corporate 
governance over the past decade—“[it] is not an abstract academic 
controversy over the optimal structure of corporate governance regimes.  It 
is a knockdown, drag-out political brawl.”19  This observation applies to 
governance generally, the Dodd-Frank Act and the implementing rules of 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  Citizens United 
itself has become a partisan political issue, although it is in reality a 
freedom of speech case which transcends party dualism.20 
Of course, Citizens United is a product of its time and place.  The 
modern era of corporate governance is, however, very different from the 
era which preceded it.21  The defining characteristic of the modern era is 
that stockholder rights have been elevated to a point higher than at any 
other time in history.  The United States Supreme Court recognized this—
and post-Citizens United policy makers should as well. 
 
A.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act of 201022 was a major legislative effort, and 
much has been written about its implications for banks, financial markets 
and consumers.  The impetus for the legislation was the perceived flaws 
and imperfections in the bank regulatory framework brought to light during 
and in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.23  Overall, the law is 
primarily a banking regulatory package—the majority of the law’s 2,319 
pages and the most high-profile changes relate to financial markets and the 
regulatory structure.24  The legislation was pulled together relatively 
quickly, and was a priority of the Obama administration.  In spite of this, or 
 
REV. 649, 651–53; 656–69; 694–96 (1995). 
 19. Joseph Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 
65 BUS. LAW. 361, 378 (2010). 
 20. See Kimberley A. Strassel, The Biggest Election Myths of 2010, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29. 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304173704575579073369144924.html. 
 21. Prior to the modern governance era, there was little in the way of change in how corporations 
were overseen. Boards were largely advisory in nature, as opposed to active overseers of management.  
Many were subject to management capture, and shareholders exercised less influence in the governance 
of the corporate body than they do in the modern era. 
 22. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Act Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 23. See id. at Preamble. Whether corporate governance failures contributed to the financial 
meltdown is an interesting question.  In a precursor to Dodd-Frank, Senator Charles Schumer declared 
“among the central causes of the financial and economic crises . . . has been a widespread failure of 
corporate governance.”  Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 2(1) (2009). 
 24. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 111–23; 331–36; 341–78; 401–16; 601–28; 711–54; 761–74; 
801–14; 901–19D; 931–39H; 961–68; 1011–29A. 
COFFIN-CITIZENS UNITED-09-23-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  3:49 PM 
110 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 8:1 
perhaps because of it, Dodd-Frank’s passage was characterized by partisan 
politics, last-minute deal making and regulatory turf fighting.25  
Consequently, some of Dodd-Frank’s provisions have been criticized as 
unfair to business, overly burdensome and the product of hasty 
compromise.26 
Along with the thousands of pages on financial markets, Dodd-Frank 
contains several sections relating to corporate governance, shareholder 
elections and executive compensation.27  How these provisions relate to the 
causes of the financial crisis are subject to debate; at least one work has 
suggested that corporate governance was not responsible for the financial 
meltdown of 2008.28  Nonetheless, by extending its reach to all public 
companies, arguably the governance provisions will have a more far-
reaching effect than the financial sections.  Dodd-Frank may also be 
viewed as a continuation of a trend set in motion by another act of 
Congress also known for its Senate and House sponsors, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.29 
Sarbanes-Oxley was important because of its reforms to financial 
reporting, the auditing profession, and the audit committee.  It also 
represented the federal government’s most significant substantive intrusion 
into traditional areas of state governance.30  Its reforms, targeted at the 
financial reporting scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s, constitute 
the first time the federal government directed board behavior by mandating 
compositional changes to the audit committee membership.31  A necessary 
 
 25. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round 
II, (Univ. of Cal., L.A., Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 10–12, 2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1673575. 
 26. See, e.g.,  Lynn Hume, Senate Banking Republicans Express Concern About Rushing Dodd-
Frank, THE BOND BUYER (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_33/dodd_frank_ 
changes-1023382-1.html (quoting a letter from Senator Richard Shelby, R-Ala, and nine other 
Republican members of the Senate Banking Committee to the SEC and other regulators implementing 
Dodd-Frank). 
 27. See Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 951–57; 971–72. 
 28. See Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market 
Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (2009). 
 29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 30. While historically the federal government, and primarily the SEC, provided regulations in the 
corporate realm, those regulations were largely disclosure oriented, and designed to enhance, rather 
than replace, state corporate law.  The “one share one vote rule” was rejected by a federal court for 
being beyond the jurisdictional reach of the SEC. Bus.  See Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
 31. For a general discussion of the relative merits of rules based versus internal board incentives, 
see generally Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In Re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended 
Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691 (2004).  In that article, Elson and Gyves argue that rules-
based incentives on director behavior, such as those dictated by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, or 
judicial mandates like those embodied in the foundational Delaware Court of Chancery opinion In re 
Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), can create an “empty triumph of form over substance.”  Id. at 
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consequence of federal rulemaking was that interpretation of the rules, their 
enforcement and ultimately their resolution of disputes concerning 
Sarbanes-Oxley requirements became a federal, rather than state, matter.  
The fiduciary responsibilities of directors, governed by state corporate 
law,32 did not disappear, but insofar as an audit committee member was 
concerned, Sarbanes-Oxley provided a new dimension to director roles and 
responsibilities.33 
Commentators have identified several similarities between Sarbanes 
Oxley and Dodd-Frank.34  Like many congressional actions, these are the 
by-products of events or crises which resulted in a call to action.  In 
governance terms, both Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank share other 
common characteristics, including the adoption of a federalist approach to 
corporate law.35  Federally directed corporate governance rules influenced 
by a variety of political actors, including shareholder groups, are the new 
normal state of affairs in governance.36  It is a change in the process by 
which corporate governance and the law has been developed, and 
 
692.   It is better, they argue, to align board and shareholder interests through equity ownership so that 
boards will act as effective monitors of management for the right reasons—protection of shareholder 
interests—rather than to “check the box” and avoid liability.  Id.  Leaving aside for now the question of 
how, in the financial crisis of 2008, boards of certain financial institutions with significant equity 
ownership failed to oversee properly the risk taking activities of their companies, the argument 
postulated by Elson & Gyves translates into the Sarbanes-Oxley audit committee realm.  A brief review 
of a typical audit committee charter reveals over twenty-five substantive duties, mostly financial 
reporting related, but also including discussing with management “guidelines and policies for assessing 
and managing the corporation’s exposure to risks, including reputational risk, the corporation’s major 
financial risk exposures and the steps management has taken to control such exposures.” JP Morgan 
Chase & Co., Charter of the Audit Committee, JPMORGANCHASE.COM, http://www.jpmorganchase. 
com/corporate/About-JPMC/audit-committee-charter.htm. The point here is not to criticize the JP 
Morgan Audit Committee, or its charter, which represent a typical example of an audit committee work 
plan.  The relevant point being that this charter is largely the by-product of Sarbanes-Oxley, and by so 
doing, Sarbanes-Oxley has had a major, substantive effect on the business of the audit committee, 
whose conduct heretofore had been primarily, if not exclusively, governed by the law of a state—that is, 
Delaware. 
 32. See COX ET AL., supra note 13, at 179–80. 
 33. For a fascinating exposition of how state (Delaware) law coexists with the federal insider 
trading regime, see Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 34. See Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 1; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making 
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1523 (2005). 
 35. See Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 17.  Bainbridge identifies eight characteristics of what he and 
Professor Roberta Romano term “quack corporate governance:” (1) a law enacted in response to a 
major negative economic event; (2) a law enacted in a crisis environment; (3) a law in response to a 
populist backlash against corporations and/or markets; (4) a law adopted at the federal rather than the 
state level; (5) a law that transfers power from the states to the federal government; (6) a law which 
interest groups that are strong at the federal level but weak at the Delaware level support (institutional 
investors); (7) a law that is not novel, but represents a longstanding agenda item of some powerful 
interest group (again institutional investors); and (8) the empirical evidence cited in support of the 
proposal is, at best, mixed and may show the proposal to be unwise. Id. 
 36. See Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 41. 
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represents a shift from the state system to the federal process.  The effects  
of these changes may not be evident until there is some period of time for 
the changes to take place and for a new equilibrium to be established. 
Increased shareholder power from the federal level necessarily comes 
at the expense of state law.  Here, Dodd-Frank clashes with existing state 
corporate governance more so than did Sarbanes-Oxley.  Sarbanes-Oxley 
made compositional reforms to the audit committee.  The mandates of 
Dodd-Frank implicate the compensation committee, director elections, and 
executive compensation.  It takes the inroads made by Sarbanes-Oxley, and 
pushes them further down the line.  Of course, the back and forth between 
the autonomy of the states to set corporate law and the authority of the 
federal government to usurp those provisions is an old issue.  Indeed, the 
argument that Delaware, the cradle of corporate law, was under the 
influence of powerful corporate interests and the New York legal 
establishment was raised as early as the 1930s by Adolph Berle.  Berle 
argued for strong director fiduciary duties to counter what he believed to be 
pro-management forces, to protect shareholder interests.37 
Later, in 1974, William Cary argued broadly that state economic 
interests drive state (Delaware) decision making; these interests 
precipitated what he famously called the “race to the bottom” or a 
pandering to management and boards.38  More recently, some argue that 
Delaware’s corporate code is established by a small and insular bar, 
consisting of local attorneys whose careers (and the state’s economic 
fortunes) depend on the revenues generated by the corporate base.39  Since 
the corporate base is a pro-management, pro-board primacy constituency, 
state laws tend to neglect shareholder concerns.  Federal intervention, like 
Dodd-Frank, evens the playing field. 
Dodd-Frank was not only a political response to the financial crisis, it 
was also shaped by populist pressure and anger directed at financial 
institutions.40  Dodd-Frank is a thus an example of a modern corporate 
governance phenomenon—politically driven, shaped by the influence of 
 
 37. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365, 1371 (1932). See also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1049, 1049 (1931). 
 38. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663, 668 (1974). 
 39. See id. at 669–70. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-
Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Mark J. Roe, Washington and 
Delaware as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2009); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005). 
 40. See Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 
309, 333 (2011). 
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institutional investors, and pro-shareholder interests.41  The inherent 
contradictions in a shareholder-centric solution to the financial crisis have 
been noted, as have the political savvy of those advancing the shareholder 
agenda.42  Whether these things are optimal governance solutions is open 
for debate.  It is enough post-Citizens United to recognize the new order of 
a federally dictated, shareholder-centric governance environment shaped by 
partisan politics.43  Analyze Citizens United through this lens and you see 
the rights and responsibilities within the corporation changing.  
Shareholder rights, perhaps historically subservient to board and 
management power, are in ascendency.  The corporation itself has 
developed into a pervasive element of contemporary life.  It employs us, 
creates research and development, and funds charities.  It has helped 
globalize the world economy in ways that individuals or other associative 
forms have not.  It is natural then, given the economic power of the global 
corporation and the damage caused by the financial crisis, to challenge 
traditional assumptions and to realign the roles of the shareholder and the 
board of directors. 
 
B.  THE PROXY ACCESS BATTLE 
 
The debate over how much influence shareholders should have in the 
process by which directors are elected implicates the nature of the board-
shareholder relationship and the respective roles and responsibilities of 
each.  It is a fundamental truism of the corporate structure that directors, 
rather than shareholders, manage the daily business affairs of the 
corporation.44  Shareholders are provided specific but limited rights under 
state law, including the right to vote at shareholder meetings.45  Voting at 
an annual meeting of shareholders is a cornerstone of shareholder suffrage, 
and a tremendous amount of law and energy has been directed at getting 
the electoral process to work properly.46  This is as it should be—unless 
shareholders can direct the board at some level, they are weak participants 
in a system using their money to take risks.  If however, the election 
 
 41. Bruner, supra note 40, at 335. 
 42. Bruner, supra note 40, at 321–22 (citing Rudiger Fahlenbach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank CEO 
Incentives and the Credit Crisis 1–2 (Charles A. Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009) (finding 
that banks with CEOs with high equity stakes fared worse in the crisis than those that did not, and 
suggesting the desire for equity market approval of risk taking was a major incentive). 
 43. Bruner, supra note 40, at 336. 
 44. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2011) (The business of the corporation “shall 
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
 45. See id. § 211. 
 46. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a-pp (2011); Shareholder 
Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). 
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process fails to function as intended, a critical mechanism for corporate 
accountability will be blunted.  Without a meaningful and fair election 
process, the republic system of corporate governance that rests on board 
oversight of management subject to shareholder approval simply does not 
work.47  Empirical evidence has demonstrated the flaws in the director 
election process.48  Proposed solutions range from federal rulemaking to a 
state law system of expense reimbursement.49 
Proxy access is the shorthand phrase used to describe the proposals of 
the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to adopt a federally 
mandated system of director election rules that enable placement of 
director nominees on the corporate proxy.  Proxy access has a history that 
precedes the passage of Dodd-Frank and is illustrative for defining the 
prism through which we should view corporate governance and the 
political speech of corporations under Citizens United.50  The SEC’s new 
proxy access regime has two main elements.  The first is Rule 14a-11, 
which requires companies, subject to shareholder eligibility and other 
limitations, to include shareholder nominees for director in their proxy 
materials at annual or special meetings at which directors are to be 
elected.51  Secondly, the SEC made amendments to Exchange Act Rule 14-
8, permitting shareholder resolutions that would amend or request 
amendment to the company’s governing documents concerning nominating 
procedures for shareholder nominations, so long as the resolution does not 
conflict with Rule 14a-11.52  As amended, Rule 14a-8 would enable 
shareholders to include in a company’s proxy material bylaw amendments 
that would grant proxy access on conditions other than those contained in 
 
 47. See Leo E. Strine, Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared 
Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 
1, 12–13 (2007). 
 48. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 677 
(2007) (citing only eight contested elections from 1995-2005 in companies with a market capitalization 
greater than 200 million as evidence for a broken system).  The root causes of the problem are 
manifold; chief among them, as Bebchuk notes, is that the costs of a proxy campaign in support of 
management are born by the corporate treasury, but a challenger must pay its own way. And then, those 
costs only produce nominal ability to alter corporate policy or strategy, given that one or two candidates 
at most can reasonably be expected to prevail.  Imbalances exist at both ends of the process: A flawed 
election system fails to instill accountability at the director level, and the costs-versus-benefit 
calculation must serve to disincentivize challengers from mounting insurgent campaigns. 
 49. See Letter from John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance, University of Delaware, 
to SEC, (Jan. 13, 2010), (on file with John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance). 
 50. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 
BUS. LAW. 329, 329 (2010) (arguing that federally mandated proxy access should be the default setting 
with a right of opt out), with Grundfest, supra note 19, at 361 (arguing that companies should be 
permitted to opt in to a system of access to the company proxy through private ordering, or a company 
by company basis). 
 51. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
 52. Id. 
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14a-11, provided that the bylaws are more inclusive than 14a-11.53 
Proxy access will increase board-shareholder dialogue and may serve 
to increase board turnover, which together with CEO turnover has been on 
the rise.54  Proxy access may not usher in a new era of boardroom change 
overnight, but together with forthcoming shareholder resolutions seeking 
bylaw amendments for more liberal access than granted by Rule 14a-11, 
and proxy reimbursement (permitted under Delaware law and the ABA 
Model Code), an increased shareholder-to-board dialogue is inevitable.55 
Communications by shareholders with the board in the context of director 
elections opens a forum for a broad-ranging discussion about the 
corporation, its strategy and its results.  This is important because director 
elections implicate a broad range of corporate issues. 
A dialogue over a proposed or sitting director is more enriched than a 
dialogue regarding a shareholder resolution.  Shareholder resolutions often 
are single issue platforms, such as discrete issues of governance or a social 
policy matters.  Directors, on the other hand, are stewards of the enterprise 
and once elected, owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation as an entity and to 
all shareholders as a group.  To elect a director, therefore, is to elect an 
individual upon whom the shareholders will rely on to exercise proper 
business judgment.  At the time of election, shareholders can make 
informed assessments about the candidates’ background, qualifications and 
fitness for the company as the company stands currently, and what it may 
face in the foreseeable future. 
By contrast, discussions over shareholder resolutions regarding 
discreet matters of corporate governance are fundamentally different.  For 
example, one either favors majority voting or staggered boards, or one does 
not.  Theoretically, one’s view on these issues is the same for each 
corporation in his or her portfolio.  The feedback loop between 
shareholder-to-board and shareholder-to-shareholder over a prospective 
director is a deeper conversation than one concerning a more abstract 
discussion of the merits of a staggered board.  Corporate political speech is 
a natural agenda topic in this communication.  In fact, expressions of 
shareholder views on corporate political speech provided to the corporation 
and its existing board, or potential new board members, within the broader 
overall discussion of corporate strategy and business operations is the 
 
 53. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.  Prior to the effectiveness of the amendments, 
Rule 14a-8 permitted a company from including in its proxy materials a shareholder resolution that 
“relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the company’s board of directors or 
analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination or election.”  Id. at § 240.14a-8(i)(8). 
 54. Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisers: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L. J. 869, 873 
(2010). 
 55. Judy Warner, Power to the Shareholder, DIRECTORSHIP, Oct. 20, 2010, at 24. 
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appropriate and optimal venue for the discussion.  This is positive and 
reflective of the policy goals sought to be advanced by the SEC 
rulemaking.  Proxy access, and the resulting communications between 
shareholders and the board, will provide shareholders with an entirely new 
venue to engage the board on all issues facing the company, including 
speech.  But it is unwise policy to expect or require the corporation to 
engage in a political discussion with shareholders on a real time, or issue 
specific, basis.  This level of communication is not necessary for the other 
risks and decisions facing the enterprise—the same should hold true for 
speech. 
 
C.  SAY-ON-PAY AND COMPENSATION 
 
Executive compensation has been called a window into the 
boardroom.56  Together with selecting a CEO, setting an appropriate pay 
program is one of the most important responsibilities of the board.  
Executive compensation in the post-financial-crisis era has also become a 
focal point for investors, regulators and Congress.  As a direct 
consequence, and responding to concerns about the role excessive 
compensation played in the financial crisis,57 Dodd-Frank has enabled the 
contemporary investor with a tool kit beyond any existing state corporation 
statute.58 Dodd-Frank alters the corporate governance playing field by 
adding two new compensation-focused disclosure requirements and three 
“say-on-pay” obligations. 
Section 953 of Dodd-Frank requires all public companies to provide 
new public disclosure on the relationship between “executive compensation 
actually paid” and the company’s financial performance.59  Section 953 
also contains the requirement to disclose the median of the annual total 
compensation of all employees (the CEO excepted), the annual total 
compensation of the CEO, and a ratio comparing those two figures.  The 
Dodd-Frank pay disclosures are likely to have an effect in changing 
corporate behavior, and in so doing, may lower executive compensation.60   
 
 56. See Beverly Behan, Shareholder Rights in the Corporate Boardroom, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK: THE BOARDROOM, Sept. 28, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
managing/content/sep2008/ca20080930_690695.htm (Beverly Behan interviewing John Wilcox). 
 57. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133 (2010) (“The economic crisis revealed instances in which 
corporate executives received very high compensation despite the very poor performance by their 
firms.”). 
 58. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.01-7.05, 7.21, 
7.22, 8.08. 
 59. Dodd-Frank Act, § 953. 
 60. See Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 18 (“Therapeutic disclosures are not intended to inform 
investors. Instead, they are intended to affect substantive corporate behavior.”). 
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Disclosure-related reforms seek to influence corporate conduct from the 
inside out.61 
Section 951 of Dodd-Frank adds three say-on-pay requirements. First, 
at least once every three years, every public company must include in its 
proxy statement a separate resolution, subject to shareholder vote, to 
approve the compensation of the company’s named executive officers.62  
Second, at least once every six years, the proxy statement must include a 
separate resolution to determine whether the say-on-pay vote will occur 
every one, two, or three years.63  Third, in any proxy material or other 
shareholder solicitation in which an approval of an “extraordinary 
transaction” is sought, a shareholder vote on compensation to be received 
by the named executive officers or “golden parachutes” must be held.64  
Like shareholder resolutions under Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act, each 
of these votes will be precatory, rather than mandatory.  In deference to 
state corporate law, the Dodd-Frank Act specifies that, in addition to the 
advisory nature of the votes, such votes cannot overrule a decision made by 
a company or its board of directors, or create or change any existing state-
defined fiduciary duties of the board.65 
As argued in Part II.B on proxy access, increased shareholder input 
into compensation practices gives shareholders the proverbial “hot line” to 
the CEO’s office.  It is natural to expect board-shareholder dialogue 
regarding compensation to entail an assessment of the risks facing the 
corporation.  How a corporation’s management sets and executes against 
risk tolerances is the meat and potatoes of a best practice compensation 
plan, which should align compensation with appropriate risk levels and 
long-term gain.  Political risks are just one of the myriad risks facing the 
modern corporation.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 61. It is interesting to note that in the years after the SEC’s 1992 executive compensation 
disclosure rules, compensation among United States CEOs began a period of fantastic growth.  This 
experience was similar to the result in Canada, which adopted executive compensation disclosure rules 
earlier. 
 62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 14A(a)(1) (2010). 
 63. Id. at §  14A(a)(2). 
 64. Id. at § 14A(b). 
 65. See Id. at § 14(c).  This provision is an attempt to preserve state law principles governing 
director elections.  In light of the mandatory nature of the SEC rules, it is unclear whether this clause 
constitutes form over substance. 
 66. Spotlight on Corporate Governance—New Educational Video Series, Video 1: The Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010 and New Federalism in the Boardroom, (Oct. 26, 2010) (downloaded using iTunes), 
available at http://www.delawarecorporategovernance-blog.com. 
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III.  THE DECISION AND THE LITERATURE 
 
A.  CITIZENS UNITED INCREMENTAL RATHER THAN TRANSFORMATIONAL 
 
Despite media coverage describing it as a major change in law, the 
decision in Citizens United relaxed an important but not transformational 
section of United States campaign finance law.67  In fact, evidence from the 
2010 midterm elections, the first post-Citizens United test, does not 
indicate that a proverbial floodgate was opened or that corporate money 
overwhelmed the electoral process.68  Citizens United is a decision that is 
fundamentally rooted in the First Amendment; corporate governance plays 
an important but secondary role in the decision.  Just as the media reaction 
to the case overplayed the significance of the real world impact of Citizens 
United, proposals to modify existing corporate governance mechanisms are 
an overreaction to the decision’s meaning.  The decision is not a departure 
from long-standing precedent, but rather a reaffirmation of the rights of 
corporations which have existed and been recognized in the constitutional 
law of the United States for many years. 
Allowing independent political expenditures in direct support of both 
candidates and issues, Citizens United permits corporations to explicitly 
state what they previously were allowed to do only in circumspect terms.  
Prior to the opinion, corporations could finance political speech in favor of 
or against specific causes, but were required to stop short of directly 
advocating support for a particular candidate.69  This was an artificial 
distinction.  Companies could approach a magic line in their political 
speech, but could not cross it by using the words “vote for (or against) 
candidate X.”  Thus, Citizens United only removed an artificial barrier. 
The facts of the case are straightforward, but illustrate how illusory 
the line between permitted and illegal speech had become.  In 2008, a 
nonprofit corporation called Citizens United, funded by both corporate and 
individual donations, released a movie called “Hillary: The Movie.”70  The 
 
 67. See Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 
219 (2010) (suggesting that Citizens United is incremental, “turning up the volume of speech already in 
the political marketplace.”). 
 68. Smith, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 4–5 (citing Center for Responsive Politics statistics indicating that 
independent spending in the 2010 elections increased to $294 million from $69 million in 2006.  
Assuming that was all “Citizens United” money, the decision accounted for approximately eleven 
percent of total campaign spending, including national party and campaign spending in 2010). 
 69. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(b) (2002); Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 881 (2010). 
 70. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
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film is a critical view of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who at the time was 
a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.71  Citizens United 
intended to distribute the film via a video-on-demand service, which would 
have potentially subjected it to civil, and possibly criminal, liability under 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).72  Previously, 
these types of political communications were required to be funded through 
a Political Action Committee (“PAC”), and any entity which funded this 
type of political speech (PAC, union or corporation) was subject to 
reporting and disclaimer provisions.73  To forestall potential problems, 
Citizens United filed an action against the Federal Election Commission 
(“FEC”) for declaratory and injunctive relief in order to have the relevant 
provisions of the BCRA declared unconstitutional.74  A lower federal court, 
finding itself bound by precedents set in at least two prior United States 
Supreme Court decisions (primarily McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission75 and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce),76 ruled in 
favor of the FEC.77  Citizens United petitioned for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, which heard the case in March of 2009.  The Supreme 
Court, on its own motion, then requested additional briefs from the parties 
on the topic of whether McConnell and Austin should be overruled.78  This 
was an unusual step, and it sent a strong signal to the capital markets that 
Citizens United might change the political finance law landscape.  The date 
of this announcement was selected as a data point in this event study, 
discussed infra.  The second argument took place in September of 2009. 
At the center of the suit was Citizen United’s challenge to the sections 
of the BCRA regulating so-called “electioneering communications” by 
corporations;79 the BCRA prohibited all for-profit and most nonprofit 
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to engage in 
electioneering communications.80  Since 2007, the term “electioneering 
communication” had been interpreted to mean only those communications 
 
 71. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
 72. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, § 441b(b)(2). 
 73. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, § 441d, 441f. 
 74. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 893. 
 75. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 76. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 77. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (defining 
“electioneering communication” as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that “refers to a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and which is disseminated within thirty days of a 
primary or sixty days of a general election).  The BCRA required these communications to be funded 
by a “separately segregated fund” or PAC supported by donations (presumably voluntary) from 
employees, shareholders, or union members.  Id. at § 441(b)(2). 
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expressly advocating the election or defeat of a particular candidate.  As 
noted above, this drew a fairly thin line, one that Citizens United was 
concerned that it had crossed.81  Prior to the decision, a for-profit 
corporation could expend general treasury funds on an electioneering 
communication (such as an advertisement or website) that expressly took a 
position for or against a particular issue in a federal election, even if that 
communication mentioned the candidate’s name.  It was up to the public 
and potential voters to figure out which candidate the advertisement or 
website was advocating.82  So long as a direct expression of “vote 
for/against” or their “functional equivalent” was avoided, a for-profit 
corporation was well within the law and its First Amendment rights to 
communicate its views through issue-based communications in specific 
federal elections.83 
In deciding the case, the Court issued five separate opinions.  Justice 
Kennedy wrote the five-Justice majority opinion and Justice Stevens wrote 
the four-Justice dissent.84  From a First Amendment perspective however, a 
large majority of the Court recognized that government restrictions or 
prohibitions on corporate speech would require strict judicial scrutiny.85  
With near unanimity in opinion on that issue, the question before the Court 
was whether the government possessed sufficient interests to justify 
restricting corporate speech. 
The majority opinion makes it clear that the nature of the political 
process requires voters and the public to receive information from a variety 
of sources, including corporations, which have First Amendment rights.86 
Explicitly the Court had, in the view of Justice Kennedy, extended these 
rights to political speech.87  Quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,88 
Justice Kennedy asserted that political speech does not lose its protection 
“simply because its source is a corporation.”89  Moreover, under Bellotti, 
“the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects 
about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public 
 
 81. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 481 (2007). 
 82. Levitt, supra note 67, at 220. 
 83. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 476–77, 481–82. 
 84. Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion runs ninety pages long compared to the majority’s fifty-
seven page opinion. Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Stevens, J., dissenting), with Id. at 
880. 
 85. Compare id. at 900 (Kennedy arguing that “political speech does not loose First Amendment 
protections ‘simply because its source is a corporation’”), with id. at 945 (Stevens stating that any law 
that “burden[s] political speech . . . is always a serious matter, demanding careful scrutiny”). 
 86. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899–900. In support of this proposition, the Court cited twenty-
two Supreme Court precedents. 
 87. See id. at 900. 
 88. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 89. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784. 
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issue.”90  The reasoning and holding of Bellotti rests on the principle that 
“the Government lacks the power to ban corporations from speaking.”91 
Even prior to Bellotti, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo struck down those 
sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197192 that capped 
expenditures to influence elections (while upholding the limits on 
contributions).93  It was the potential for quid pro quo corruption that 
distinguished independent expenditures from direct contributions, with the 
former raising insufficient dangers of corrupting the political process and 
the latter (presumably invoking the proverbial briefcase stuffed with cash) 
being sufficient to support a constitutionally crafted restriction.94  Read 
together, Buckley and Bellotti present a clear and linear line of reasoning 
and precedent for the recognition of a corporate right to engage the political 
process in the electioneering stage and on presumably the same terms and 
conditions as individuals. 
In order to place a restriction on a First Amendment right, the 
government must have a compelling interest, which must survive a test of 
strict judicial scrutiny.95  The question of what government interest might 
meet that test was raised in the 1990 case of Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce.96  The Austin case disrupts the precedential line of Buckley 
and Belotti by permitting restrictions on the rights of associations of 
persons, including corporations, to speak. 
In Austin, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce intended to use 
treasury funds to run a newspaper ad in contravention of a state criminal 
law which would have made it a felony for a corporation to make 
independent expenditures in support of or against a specific candidate.97  
The Austin Court was able to bypass precedent (Buckley and Bellotti) by, as 
Justice Kennedy observed: 
[I]dentif[ying] a new government interest in limiting political speech: an anti-
distortion interest.  Austin found a compelling government interest in 
preventing the ‘corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideals.98 
 
 90. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784–785 (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. V. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 
(1972)). 
 91. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784–785. 
 92. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq.). 
 93. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976). 
 94. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901–02. 
 95. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 96. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 97. See id. 656. 
 98. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). 
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The Austin case, noted Justice Kennedy, was the outlier, allowing 
restrictions based on the inherent nature of the corporate form because the 
corporate form could harness aggregated wealth and direct it at speech.99  
Importantly, even before Austin was decided in 1990, and under that case, 
corporations possessed recognizable First Amendment rights. 
In Citizens United, the government’s rationale for restrictions were the 
Austin theory (aggregation of wealth is dangerous and can be regulated),100 
together with two other interests—the potentials of quid pro quo corruption 
or bribery,101 and the protection of those shareholders or union members 
whose internal, personal political beliefs may not be in harmony with the 
corporation’s speech.102  This last interest lies at the intersection of 
corporate political speech and corporate governance.  In addressing these 
arguments, Citizens United analyzes the corporate nature of speech in terms 
of fundamental fairness.  If the government can restrict or prevent free 
speech because it was funded by a wealthy source, the government could 
also pick and choose who may or may not speak based on other categories 
or characteristics.  This cannot be reconciled with the “premise that the 
First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech 
based on the speaker’s identity.”103  Identity and wealth are interwoven for 
these purposes, and such an argument would cover individuals with 
significant resources.  The majority expressly rejected the nature of the 
corporation versus the natural person as a basis for distinction, instead 
focusing on what the First Amendment was designed to protect: the speech 
itself.104 
That the right to political speech cannot be premised on the identity of 
the speaker is further drawn out in the case of media corporations.  As the 
majority suggests, media corporations have the same fundamental 
characteristics as non-media corporations, and can accumulate as much 
wealth as any other for-profit corporation.  Insofar as this is true, the 
BCRA’s restrictions would apply to media corporations, but for the fact 
that the BCRA expressly exempts them.105  And therein is the difficulty 
 
 99. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).  The government’s interest 
in preventing quid pro quo corruption was rejected by the Court along several grounds.  First, the type 
of corruption envisioned in a quid pro quo scheme would be covered by other anti-bribery or criminal 
laws, and second, that type of influence makes its place felt in the context of direct contributions to 
candidates where a “trade” can be made. See id. at 908–11. This is less likely in the case of an 
independent expenditure at the center of Citizens United, in which the public, rather than the elected 
official, is the ultimate decision maker (to vote for or against). See Id. at 903. 
 102. Id. at 911. 
 103. Id. at 905. 
 104. Id. at 911. 
 105. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2) (2206). 
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with Austin and the thought process that leads to the conclusion that 
corporate interests are different, special and somehow deleterious to the 
marketplace of ideas.  By exempting media corporations, the BCRA and 
the antidistortion argument “exempt[s] some corporations but cover[s] 
others, even though both have the need [and] the motive to communicate 
their views.”106  The effect of a prohibition on corporate speech would 
prevent “small and nonprofit corporations . . . from presenting both facts 
and opinions to the public.”107  Of course, the majority of the thousands of 
public companies in the United States do not possess massive aggregations 
of wealth that could be deployed to advance a political agenda.  Likewise, 
why would it be acceptable for a newspaper publisher to speak, but not a 
financial services firm which issues opinions on the markets, political 
events or macroeconomic trends? 
The issue of shareholder rights is a different one, more linked to 
governance than the First Amendment.  Do shareholders in a public 
corporation possess some rights that require protection in the event the 
corporation expressed political speech whose content offends the 
shareholder?  The Citizens United majority opinion contains a discussion 
which discusses this point, but does not explicitly recognize such a 
shareholder right.108  If such a right existed, the argument could be 
advanced that the government would be within its rights to restrict the free 
speech of any public company at any time, because the possibility will 
always exist of a dissenting minority shareholder.  Taking the case of the 
newspaper publisher again, the government could limit media speech under 
this aegis.  Here the Court was clear—the Constitution does not allow 
this.109 
In discussing the dissenting shareholder, the Court found that the 
procedures of corporate democracy serve as adequate protections for this 
problem.110  This reasoning, unfortunately for the Court, may have been 
based on the false assumption that a public company of any size would be 
able to discern the political views of its shareholders.  As discussed later in 
this article, these potential shortcomings are far from fatal.  Nonetheless, 
the majority of the Court opined that other mechanisms existed to protect 
whatever interests or rights shareholders may have in governing the free 
speech of the corporation.111 
Moreover, the Court noted that the offending provisions of the BCRA 
 
 106. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 911. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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are both “underinclusive and overinclusive” because, by its terms, the 
BCRA applied only to communications within thirty or sixty days of an 
election.  If the goal was to protect the interests of shareholders from 
speech, the prohibition should have applied to corporate political speech 
disseminated at any time during the calendar year.112  By targeting a 
relatively narrow preelection window, the BCRA had the effect of telling 
corporations that they could say whatever they wanted, but only when the 
government told them it was appropriate.  You may speak, in other words, 
when we say it is okay.  Congress was attempting to craft a rule which bore 
a justifiable relation to the perceived problem—the danger to the electoral 
process of allowing corporations to express a view on a particular candidate 
running for office.  Congress, it can be assumed, was wary of the 
constitutionality of a law containing an outright ban on political speech, 
whenever made, and thus chose time frames (thirty and sixty days before 
an election) to provide a rational nexus to the speech and the vote. 
The BCRA was overinclusive because it swept in all corporations— 
nonprofits and for-profits alike, of all sizes and ownership structures.113  
The majority opinion does not elaborate on this point, but it can be argued 
that the Court assumes that corporations have some responsibility to the 
political sensibilities of their shareholders.  If that obligation exists, the 
Court assumed that shareholders of public corporations with a single or a 
relatively discrete group of owners could ensure themselves that corporate 
political speech was aligned with their own.  This is a slippery slope, and 
although pointing to the right conclusion in Citizens United, tees up 
opportunities for post-Citizens United reforms, and fails to accord this 
purported shareholder interest secondary standing to the primary right of 
the corporation itself. 
By contrast, the dissenting opinion viewed the special characteristics 
of corporations as significant and a basis for a distinction from natural 
persons.114  Corporations have perpetual life, separation of ownership and 
control, and the ability to accumulate “resources . . . [that] ‘are not an 
indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas.’”115  
Even though the dissent looked at the corporate form in a different way 
than did the majority, the dissent recognized what is essential to the 
 
 112. It appears that Congress was concerned with suppressing the First Amendment rights of 
corporations in this design.  The First Amendment tends to work in absolute terms—corporations either 
have a right to speak or they do not.  If they do, they are entitled to the entire package of protections 
afforded by the First Amendment’s umbrella.  There are not two First Amendments, one for natural 
persons and one for corporations. 
 113. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. 
 114. Id. at 945–49. 
 115. Id. at 971 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 659). 
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corporate right and responsibility to engage in political speech: 
corporations “engage the political process in instrumental terms” to enable 
them to “maximize shareholder value.”116  Corporations do not necessarily, 
the dissent states, engage for the purposes of advancing “any broader 
notion of the public good.”117  What the dissent did not add to this 
statement, but what is a necessary corollary for governance purposes, is 
corporations may act in furtherance of other goals and stakeholders (in 
addition to the maximization of shareholder value) provided there is a 
nexus to the long term best interests of the corporation.118  This 
convergence is essential to the understanding of the strong interest in 
franchise protection which may require corporations to exercise their rights 
to political speech. 
Justice Stevens’ opinion argues it is legitimate for the government to 
protect the right of individuals who have paid money into a corporation 
from being forced to support political candidates they may otherwise 
oppose.119  According to the dissent, the rights of shareholders are virtually 
“nonexistent” and would not rise to the level of enabling a shareholder to 
protect his or her interests.120  Critically, as Justice Stevens observed, most 
Americans own stocks through intermediaries, “which makes it more 
difficult both to monitor and to alter particular holdings.”121  Addressing the 
use of treasury funds in the lobbying and charitable contexts, the dissent 
distinguished electioneering communications by stating the selection of 
public officials is the “area in which ‘the interests of unwilling . . . 
corporate shareholders [in not being] forced to subsidize that speech are at 
 
 116. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 965. 
 117. Id. As an aside, it could be noted that natural persons do not always act for the greater good 
either. 
 118. See Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). Delaware 
courts have long permitted boards to consider factors other than shareholder interests if there is a nexus 
to the corporate purpose. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1986); Leo 
E. Strine Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control 
Transactions:  Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1177–85 (2002).  Several states 
have adopted so-called stakeholder statutes as part of their corporation laws to make it clear that boards 
of directors may consider the interests of stakeholders other than the shareholders, such as the 
community at large, employees and suppliers when making corporate decisions. See generally Miriam 
A. Cherry & Judd F. Snierson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Greenwashing After the BO Oil Disaster, 85 TULANE L. REV. 983 (2011). Thus, United States 
corporations, while guided by economic motives first and foremost, can and do act with other interests 
in mind. See Charles Elson, Five Reasons to Support Shareholder Primacy, DIRECTORSHIP, Apr. 15, 
2010, at 63–65. 
 119. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (quoting Nation’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 
207–08). 
 120. Id. (citing Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 320 (1999)). 
 121. Id. 
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their zenith.’”122  The dissent then acknowledged that shareholder 
protection was not “an adequate or independent” interest to sustain a 
suppression of the First Amendment, and that it would take more to restrict 
corporate speech. 
Citizens United provides two very different takes on the United States 
system of corporate governance.  The Supreme Court Justices in the 
minority on Citizens United would take a paternalistic view.  These 
Justices, implicitly at least, do not think very much of shareholder 
democracy as an accountability mechanism or as a means of allocating 
roles and responsibilities in governance.  They did not explicitly 
acknowledge the ascendency of the modern shareholder, instead 
referencing “nonexistent” shareholder rights.  The minority view may be 
more indicative of a pre-Dodd-Frank governance era.  That sitting Justices 
of the Supreme Court should have this view may be symptomatic of the 
general sentiment in policy today with regards to the shareholder board 
dynamic, and which may partially explain how shareholder advanced 
initiatives continue to hit their mark.  They may, in other words, be 
referencing a governance landscape that has changed, and is no longer 
tilted in favor of management and the board of directors. 
 
B.  SHAREHOLDER-DIRECTED POLITICAL SPEECH 
 
Political speech, similar in many ways to charitable contributions or 
lobbying efforts, has been nonetheless portrayed by some commentators as 
fundamentally different.  One possible response to this perceived difference 
is to assign more shareholder rights to overseeing political speech.  This is 
the tack taken by those who favor a high degree of shareholder 
involvement in the ordinary business affairs of the corporation.  Decisions 
made in the ordinary course of business are generally within the purview of 
the management as overseen by the board of directors.  Shareholders, it is 
asserted, ordinarily have no direct role, either in a preapproval or an ex post 
facto review context, in the decision-making process.123  Some reformers 
would change this system for political speech purposes.  They note that, 
absent special circumstances, shareholders have limited corporate 
governance options—the option to sue (often in a derivative context 
alleging a breach of fiduciary duties), to assert a precatory shareholder 
resolution, utilize the corporate democracy process to elect a new board, or 
 
 122. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978. 
 123. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (stating that the business affairs of the 
corporation are managed by a board of directors). See also Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 
(Del. 1990); Aaronson v. Lewis, 473A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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divest their ownership interests.  These have been the remedies available to 
shareholders under the United States system of governance for over one 
hundred years (in the case of shareholder resolutions under Exchange Act 
Rule 14a-8, over seventy years).124  Like the minority of justices on the 
Court, reformers do not believe these rights are adequate or sufficient, 
particularly for corporate political speech. 
What makes the constitutionally-protected right to engage in political 
speech different from the dozens of other actions taken by management and 
overseen by the board?  How is political speech different in kind from 
commercial speech, charitable contributions, or even direct lobbying?  
There are at least three main issues with political speech articulated by 
those who would assert additional shareholder sovereignty over corporate 
expression.  These are: (1) the potential for the divergence of interests 
between the corporation and some, all or a minority of shareholders; (2) the 
expenditure of significant corporate resources; and (3) the rights of 
shareholders not to be forced to associate with views they do not support or 
may in fact oppose. 
A proponent of increased shareholder sovereignty is Lucien Bebchuk, 
one of the major voices in corporate law and governance in academia, who 
together with Robert Jackson, asserts that a new paradigm is required post-
Citizens United.125  They argue, in part, that there is “no role for 
shareholders . . . no mandatory role for independent directors . . . and no 
mandatory disclosure to directors” of corporate political speech.126  
Assessing the state law of fiduciary duties and board powers, they conclude 
boards are free to delegate matters of political speech to management or to 
take action themselves unilaterally.127  Arguing that there exists a 
“significant likelihood” that the political motivations of directors and 
executives will diverge from shareholders, Bebchuk and Jackson propose a 
 
 124. Recently, the staff of the SEC recognized that a proposed shareholder proposal requesting a 
report on lobbying expenses fell within the ordinary business exemption of the rule and could be 
excluded.  See Letter from SEC to Amy L. Goodman, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, (Feb. 17, 2009) 
(on file with Westlaw). See also  Letter from SEC to Martin P. Dunn, O’Melveny & Meyers LLP, 
(March 5, 2010) (on file with Westlaw) (allowing corporation to exclude shareholder resolution 
requesting a report on political contributions and payments used for grassroots lobbying). 
 125. See generally Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 6. 
 126. Id. at 87. 
 127. Id. at 88 (citing BRUCE FREED & JAMIE CARROLL, OPEN WINDOWS: HOW CODES OF CONDUCT 
REGULATE CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING AND A MODEL CODE TO PROTECT COMPANY INTERESTS 
AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 15 & n.18 (2007), for the proposition that of one hundred large public 
companies, thirty-four require board level approval of political expenditures).  It should be noted that 
board approval in this context is likely to mean explicit board approval prior to each expenditure.  It 
does not taken into account the board is responsible for overseeing all of management’s activities under 
state fiduciary duty principles, including risk management.  See In re Citigroup Derivative Litig., 964 
A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
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default mandatory law allowing shareholders a veto over the overall 
amount of funds spent on political speech.128  They argue such a rule should 
cover direct independent expenditures as well as payments made to 
intermediaries.129  Further, they argue for a change in the structure of 
corporate resolution process, advocating shareholders be allowed to adopt 
resolutions that are binding on the board and the corporation in which 
shareholders could “direct that the corporation may not spend funds for 
certain types of political purposes (such as judicial campaigns or the 
election of a particular candidate)” so that not only the amount of funds 
used in speech but the intended subjects of the speech would be subject to 
binding shareholder resolution.130  The nature of the board’s role would 
also change under their proposed shareholder primacy approach.  Bebchuk 
and Jackson argue for the adoption (at the federal level) of rules mandating 
that corporate speech decisions be approved or overseen by a committee of 
independent directors.  In order to ensure the constitutionality of this 
regime, the proposed laws would be default settings, with opt out by 
shareholder vote.131 
This proposal is at first attractive, and has the linear appeal of ceding 
ultimate decision-making authority with the residual owners of the 
enterprise.  This approach starts with the view that taking a position on a 
candidate is fundamentally different from plant openings and closings, 
expansion into or retreat from geographical markets or product lines, and 
decisions regarding outsourcing, human resources or employee rights.  
Assuming that an expression of support for a congressional candidate is a 
higher impact decision than a decision to close or merge a business line, 
shareholder reformers then seek to add protections around the internal 
decision making process of the corporation. 
Interestingly, the argument is made that there is a significant 
likelihood that the views of directors and management may diverge from 
those of shareholders.  For this purpose, we may consider three major 
spheres of influence relevant to the corporate welfare.  Sphere one would 
encompass the business strategy and affairs of the corporation, its products, 
services and ordinary activities.  Sphere two would consist of the rules 
governing the corporation itself, governance, shareholder rights, voting, 
and procedures.  The third and final sphere would be the political beliefs of 
the directors, executives and shareholders, as individuals, and concerning 
any of the issues inherent in being a citizen in the public realm. 
 
 128. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 6, at 89–90. 
 129. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 6, at 98. 
 130. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 6, at 99. 
 131. Id. at 92. 
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When a corporation, its management and board operate within sphere 
one, they are, absent breaches of fiduciary duty or ultra vires acts, within 
the parameters of the business judgment rule.  The rationale underlying the 
business judgment rule includes that by shielding decision making from 
undue judicial review, the directors, as opposed to the shareholders, 
manage the corporation.132  Centralized decision making, without 
unwarranted interference by shareholders preserves the corporate structure 
of a board elected by shareholders for the purpose of overseeing 
management.  In fact, it has been stated that the business judgment rule, as 
a lynch pin of the corporate governance structure itself, “ultimately serves 
the more important function of protecting stockholders from 
themselves.”133 Shareholder-directed reformers essentially posit the 
question—is corporate support of a federal candidate for office enough of a 
deviation from the corporate function to justify a change in the basic 
allocation of power between boards and shareholders itself?  They answer 
“yes,” and thus the reforms suggested would have the effect of re-
allocating the responsibilities of the board and shareholders. 
It is submitted that the debate over whether political speech 
shareholder resolutions should remain precatory or should be made 
mandatory involves so many variables, and would require the input and 
agreement of numerous constituencies as to render the practical 
possibilities of such a change occurring as all but theoretical, and not a 
valid policy suggestion.  Long-standing issues of federal and state 
allocation of law are similarly implicated and would similarly be 
displaced.134  The hurdles to be jumped for the reform approach to take 
place are many and high.135  If political speech resolutions were mandatory, 
 
 132. DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE - FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE 
DIRECTORS 17–18, 3rd ed. 1989. 
 133. Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: 
Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 522 (1989). 
 134. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).  In that case, 
the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a shareholder initiated bylaw which would require the board 
of directors to reimburse all candidates in proxy ballot director elections out of corporate funds.  The 
Delaware Supreme Court held that the bylaw had the effect of violating Delaware state law because it 
would remove the ability of the board of directors to exercise fiduciary duties by requiring 
reimbursement in all circumstances.  Id.  The case may be read as standing for the proposition that 
under Delaware corporate law, even shareholder-driven bylaws may not supplant the province of the 
board of directors to use their judgment in the exercise of their fiduciary duties. 
 135. See Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, (Ill. Program in Law, 
Behavior and Social Science, Working Paper No. LBSS11-05, 2011) available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1739264.  Professor Ribstein’s work is complementary to the approach of this article.  He 
recognizes that the Court left open the possibility for other forms of regulation of corporate speech, but 
concludes that a methodology based on corporate governance processes would be ineffective and 
possibly unconstitutional.  A corporate governance-based restriction, argues Ribstein, would protect 
certain shareholders, but may infringe the rights of other stakeholders.  Id. at 26.  In addition, such an 
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the reasoning would apply to all categories of shareholder initiatives.  It is 
unclear, at best, if shareholders as a group would even want this level of 
influence.  It is clear that shareholders do not possess these rights under 
contemporary American jurisprudence. 
Finally, the adoption of some or all of these reforms would not ensure 
that shareholder political preferences would be protected.  The important 
factor is that it is the speech itself that matters.  Policies designed to ring 
fence the speech by counting votes on the one hand or directing its funding 
on the other are doomed to fail.  Assume, as is the case in the United 
Kingdom, shareholders are given the authority to vote by proxy on a 
proposed budget.  Assume further that shareholders possess sufficient 
information about the nature and costs of political speech to make an 
informed vote.  If Company X conducts a proxy vote which results in an 
authorization of a corporate spending budget of $100,000 per annum,136 can 
there be any degree of confidence that a budget will prevent the resulting 
speech from offending any shareholders?  A $100 expenditure can convey 
the same message as a $100,000 one.  The mythical shareholder’s personal 
views could be offended by a posting on a website (which costs relatively 
nothing) just as they could be offended by a multimillion-dollar ad 
campaign.  In the information age, it is difficult to tell the former from the 
latter.  And, from that shareholder’s perspective, it really does not matter.  
That’s what makes speech unique. 
It is argued that budgets serve another purpose, that is, to limit the 
funds spent so as to prevent waste or similar misuse of corporate assets. 
However, in the age of the internet, where a cheaply made video can “go 
viral” on YouTube and be seen by millions of viewers in a matter of hours, 
or a Facebook post or a Twitter “tweet” can reach a global audience in a 
matter of minutes, does Company X’s annual budget of $100,000 have any 
relation at all to the impact its speech may have?  Budgets therefore do not 
go to the ultimate problem the reformers seek to address—prevention of 
shareholder political disagreements with the corporation.  Because it is the 
speech itself that matters, not how much it costs or who paid for it, giving 
 
approach may prove to be unconstitutional under the Citizens United “listeners’ rights” rationale.  Id.  
Ribstein concludes that any corporate governance reforms aimed at shareholders would require a 
balancing against the frustration of the speech generally, and the expressive rights of other shareholders 
and stakeholders.  Id. He further cautions that what he terms the “listeners’ rights” rationale of Citizens 
United—that the marketplace of ideas has a right to hear speech and decide for itself the merit of that 
speech, may raise additional questions concerning the constitutionality of securities laws that have the 
effect of constraining speech, including those concerning speech under Regulation FD.  Id.  The better 
course, he argues, is to “err on the side of free speech.”  Id. at 38. 
 136. Some have argued for the adoption of the United Kingdom approach to corporate governance 
as it applies to political speech.  The fact that the United Kingdom does not have the United States 
Constitution and the First Amendment thereto makes a direct analogy difficult. 
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shareholders the power of the purse is of limited utility in protecting them 
from a statement with which they disagree. 
In order to accept the notion of the shareholder-directed speech reform 
package, one must first accept that corporate political speech is 
unmanageable within the existing corporate structure.  Then, even if that 
were the case, one must consider whether putting the decision in the hands 
of the many—the shareholders—makes the agency problem better, or 
worse.  Organization and decision-making theory would point to the 
conclusion that corporate political speech directed by a large, decentralized 
group comprised of many different constituencies would be more difficult 
to manage than if directed by a concentrated group with clear fiduciary 
roles and responsibilities.  Unless, the real goal of the governance reform is 
not to further the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, but 
to suppress the speech—which the Constitution forbids. 
 
C.  BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AS RISK MONITORS 
 
As noted above, boards of directors have the primary responsibility for 
corporate oversight in the history of American corporate law—but the 
concept as it has been applied to practice has evolved as corporations 
became larger, more complex, and subject to increased government 
oversight and regulation.  The board’s responsibility to monitor 
management, at least insofar as providing a backstop against fraud and 
illegal or unethical conduct however, is a relatively new concept in 
corporate law and has been articulated only in the last twenty years.  A 
board’s duties to watch over management to prevent illegality arose in two 
distinct contexts and together frame the duty to oversee political speech as 
a risk management function. 
The duty to monitor management, and more precisely to ensure that 
the corporation established policies, processes and controls to detect fraud 
and illegal conduct were articulated in the seminal decision In re 
Caremark.137  Prior to this decision, United States corporations were in an 
unusual position of being subject to state fiduciary duties which were out of 
synch with the requirements imposed upon them by federal rules and 
regulations, including the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  This conflict was 
resolved in the Caremark case, which served to break the law of Delaware 
from the less-demanding duties set forth in the 1963 decision of the 
Delaware Supreme Court Graham v. Allis Chalmers.138  In Graham, the 
 
 137. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). The approach taken in Caremark was later adopted in Stone v. 
Ritter, 119 A.2d 362 (2006). 
 138. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
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Delaware Supreme Court famously noted that directors “are entitled to rely 
on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to 
put them” on notice that something is wrong.139  Until that point of notice, 
the pre-1996 director of a Delaware corporation had “no duty to . . . install 
and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing” at 
the corporation.140 
Caremark changed that policy, with the articulation of the well-
established duty to adopt an information and reporting system that is 
reasonably designed to provide “timely, accurate information to allow 
management and the board . . . to reach informed judgments concerning 
both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business 
performance.”141  The articulation of this duty served at least two policy 
interests: to “catch up” the Delaware law of director fiduciary duty with the 
federal expectation—if not a duty—contained in the United States Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for corporations to establish policies and procedures 
designed to detect illegal conduct; and to recognize that corporations were 
subject to an increasing body of regulations and criminal laws designed 
specifically with corporations in mind. 
That a board of director’s fiduciary duty to oversee the business 
activities of a corporation extends beyond the obligation to monitor 
compliance with laws and regulations was implicit in the original Caremark 
opinion.  The Delaware Court of Chancery (and later blessed by the 
Delaware Supreme Court) defines the oversight duty scope as “both the 
corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.”142  The 
Court correctly recognized that an informed director must understand the 
business performance of the corporation—and to understand business 
performance; a director must understand its products, services, 
marketplace, the regulatory environment in which it operates, and the risks 
inherent in the business.143  Risk management may be seen as an organic 
duty, a component of the duties of care and loyalty (and good faith).144 
Risk management responsibilities and expectations derive from at 
least two other sources.  Increasingly they are explicitly regulatory 
expectations.145  The United States and international regulators have 
consistently required corporations subject to applicable rules to understand 
 
 139. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. 
 140. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. 
 141. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 965. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See A.B.A. COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 27–28 (5th ed. 
2007) (describing obligations of the board for both compliance and risk management). 
 144. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that the director duty of 
oversight is part of the duty to act in good faith). 
 145. See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act, 12 C.F.R. § 225.175 (2005). 
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and monitor risk in several ways.  First, there must be a “tone from the top” 
of the board and the most senior management of the organization, which 
sets the organizational appetite for risk, defines its limits and monitors the 
risk profile across the organization.  The tone from the top must be driven 
into the organization through a system of policies, procedures and controls 
that capture monitor and assess risks.146  The COSO ERM framework notes 
that the board of directors has a “key role” in the oversight of enterprise 
risk management, and should be appraised on a timely basis of material 
risks, management’s assessment of those risks, and the planned 
organizational response.147  Under this guidance, the board must reach a 
level of comfort that appropriate processes are in place and that 
management is positioned to not only identify, assess and respond to risk, 
but to bring relevant information to the board on a timely basis.148 
Dodd-Frank itself explicitly requires certain financial institutions and 
other systemically important nonfinancial institutions to create a risk 
management committee which would include at least one risk management 
expert with experience in managing risk at large companies.149  Risk 
management committees under Dodd-Frank have responsibility for a broad 
array of risk identification and management.  These requirements were 
outgrowths of concerns that the financial crisis of 2008 was, at least in part, 
caused by a failure of risk management—that institutions did not 
understand the full scope and nature of the risks of the financial 
instruments and derivative products they were buying, selling or holding. 
The SEC has adopted disclosure requirements to the company proxy 
requiring all companies, financial and nonfinancial, to discuss the 
leadership structure of the board and the board’s role in risk management.  
Public companies are required to disclose the nature of the board’s role in 
overseeing risk, such as how the board administers its oversight function, 
the effect that risk oversight has on the board’s process, and whether and 
how the board or board committee monitors risk.  The requirements 
identify the board of directors as the proper body to oversee the risk 
management policies, procedures and controls of the company.  Modern 
boards should assess all material risks and opportunities facing the firm.  
Political or regulatory risks and opportunities can be as immediate, and as 
 
 146. See Comm. of Sponsoring Orgs. of the Treadway Comm’n, Enterprise Risk Management – 
Integrated Framework (2004), http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf 
[hereinafter ERM Framework]. The COSO Enterprise Risk Management (“ERM”) approach involves 
the component elements of the Internal Environment (a role of the board of directors); Objective 
Setting; Event Identification; Risk Assessment; Risk Response; Control Activities; Information and 
Communication; and Monitoring. 
 147. See Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework, supra note 146, at 6. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Dodd-Frank Act § 162, 124 STAT. 1376, 60, 66. 
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significant, as market or credit risks.  They should be managed in a similar 
fashion. 
 
IV.  A CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO SPEAK 
 
A.  NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Previous attempts to measure the potential effect of political speech 
may have on public companies have concluded that the effect, to the extent 
it is measurable, is a negative one.  For example, looking at data from 1998 
to 2004, a 2010 study found that pro-shareholder governance was 
negatively related to observable political activity, and that political activity 
was strongly negatively related to firm value.150  This study, although 
comprehensive in its approach and use of data, did not capture the effect of 
the Citizens United decision in its data sample.  The author of the study, 
Professor Coates, rightly pointed out that disclosure practices varied and 
were inconsistent across public companies.  Measuring corporate political 
speech was difficult.  However, Coates reasoned that what was observable 
was probably the tip of the iceberg in terms of observable activity.  Any 
negative implications of political speech, he reasons, would tend to be 
understated by the data.151  The study concluded that the analysis “[did] not 
definitively prove that political activity harm[ed] shareholders,” but argued 
that definitive proof may never be forthcoming, requiring policy to be built 
on a “combination of theory and suggestive evidence.”152  This combination 
suggests that laws replacing restrictions that were removed by Citizens 
United should be replaced, and that such laws or protections would be 
valuable to shareholders.153 
The empirical analysis contained in this article reaches a different 
conclusion and concludes with good news for both corporations and their 
shareholders.  The research herein assesses data from the time of the 
Citizens United decision until the midterm elections of 2010.  The ultimate 
finding of this assessment is that the decision in Citizens United did not 
adversely affect the stock prices of a portfolio of companies known (or 
likely) to have exercised their First Amendment rights.  Moreover, the 
stock prices of those companies which publicly declared that they would 
not use corporate treasury funds in political speech did not fare better than 
 
 150. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity:  What Effect Will 
Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth?, 1 (Harvard Law & Economics, Discussion Paper No. 
684, 2010). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 16. 
 153. Id. 
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those that did not.  Citizens United, it appears, and the concomitant right to 
free speech, is unrelated to stock price, or the market’s perception of value. 
The following section discusses three hypotheses and provides 
analysis, data and conclusions.  The Appendices contain the supporting 
data in chart format. 
 
1.  Hypotheses 
 
The first hypothesis begins with the straw man argument that political 
speech by corporations, either because of agency issues or other effects, is 
detrimental to firm value.  This is the implication of prior work, is a reason 
why laws were passed restricting corporate speech, and is why reformers 
seek to scale back Citizens United.  According to this logic, if Citizens 
United was harmful to public companies, the share prices of companies 
who engaged in permissible pre-Citizens United political speech, and who 
would likely engage in even more speech post-Citizens United, would be 
diminished or penalized by the market.154 
Hypothesis One tests for a market reaction against firms who engage 
in political speech.  If corporate political speech has a negative effect on 
firm value, the stock prices of companies known or likely to engage in 
corporate political speech should decline after the decision was announced 
in January of 2010.  A portfolio of forty-three securities was selected, 
based on publicly available information concerning history and disclosures 
of political activity.  On the flip side, several public corporations, either at 
the request of a third party or on their own accord, have publicly pledged 
not to use corporate treasury finds to make political contributions.  It can be 
inferred that companies, by making their pledge public knowledge, were 
looking to obtain some benefit and enhance their market value.  Hypothesis 
Two explores whether or not the share prices of corporations who made an 
“anti-Citizens United” public pledge did, in fact, increase. 
H1: If public firms engage in corporate political speech, firms’ 
abnormal returns, around the event of the decision of Citizens United, 
would be significantly lower than the S&P 500 Index. 
H2: Abnormal returns for firms that have pledged not to use corporate 
treasury funds to make political contributions should exceed those of the 
 
 154. As to the question of the intention of a firm to so speak, and whether that intention was or is 
known by the market, we can make assumptions based on public information, past tendencies and 
incentives.  While no event study of this type can accurately discern whether a corporation intends to do 
or not do something, it is worth considering that market reactions, particularly in and around significant 
events like the decision, are based on the expectations of the markets themselves, and not the actual 
company practices.   If the markets believe Company X is engaging in a practice for which the market 
would assess a discount, the market will likely react to the perception. 
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S&P 500 Index. 
To test the effects of Citizens United on market value at a broader 
level, United States equity indices were also examined.  The indices 
selected are industry specific.  Already regulated industries, such as banks 
and health care, were facing the prospect of further material legislation 
during the 2009 and 2010 period around the time of the decision in Citizens 
United.  It was logical to assume that companies in these industries/indices 
had a high interest to engage in political speech.  Press reports, particularly 
linked to the financial services industry, noted how banks spent 
considerable amounts of time, political capital and energy to educate and 
influence lawmakers in the run up to the Dodd-Frank legislation.  
Similarly, health care companies faced the prospect of historic reform 
affecting virtually all aspects of the business.  These industries were 
engaging in lobbying, political discourse through PACs and other permitted 
pre-Citizens United channels.  In the face of historic legislation, firms in 
these industries (while not the only industries) had a high incentive to take 
advantage of all means available to them.  Thus, in order to add perspective 
to the firm-specific findings from Hypotheses One and Two, indexes from 
financial services and health care were selected to compare with S&P 500 
returns.  Other industries, not facing the prospect of material legislation, 
were also analyzed and their returns also compared to broad market returns. 
H3: Abnormal index returns of industries involved in pending 
government regulation in 2009 and 2010, and therefore likely to engage in 
corporate political speech, are lower than cumulative returns of the S&P 
500. 
All three hypotheses are constructed as “one-tailed,”155 the following 
analysis of each hypothesis examines and assesses differences positive or 
negative.  Thus, the empirical work that follows is for “two-tailed”156 
hypotheses tests because the presence, or absence, of statistically 
significant abnormal returns is what the hypotheses seek to explore.  
Therefore, the tests conducted examined whether stock prices for the 
sample increased or decreased. 
 
 
 155. In statistics, when testing a hypothesis, a one-tailed test refers to only assessing significance in 
one direction of interest.  For a symmetrical, normal probability plot of outcomes, this involves 
detecting an effect in one direction by not testing the effect in the other direction.  A one-tailed analysis 
allows for more power in detecting an effect; however, it may result in an incomplete analysis by 
missing significant effects in the other direction. 
 156. In contrast to a one-tailed test, a two-tailed analysis tests significance in both directions, that is 
whether a mean is significantly greater than x or whether the mean is significantly less than x.  This 
analysis is more robust than a one-tailed test and allows for testing the possibility of a relationship in 
both directions, regardless of the hypothesized relationship. See figure of normal probability plot. 
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2.  Methodology 
 
a.  Data Collection: List of Companies 
 
A list of forty-three firms was generated containing public companies 
which were known to make or had made political contributions with either 
corporate treasury funds, through PACS or through intermediaries such as 
the United States Chamber of Commerce.157  These companies, it may be 
reasoned, would be the most likely candidates to amplify their political 
speech using the new freedoms granted by Citizens United. 
During January of 2010, certain United States industries were facing 
the possibility of increased reform and legislation regarding their business 
practices.  Examples of such political activities during that month included 
the debate about financial reform, the Dodd-Frank Act and the creation of a 
national health insurance plan.  These proposed reforms would have had a 
significant impact on firms in the fields of financial services, healthcare, 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.  Thus, firms in these industries had 
incentive to make political contributions in order to support certain political 
opinions regarding these issues. 
In the months leading up to the 2010 election, certain companies 
signed the New York City Public Advocate’s pledge not to use corporate 
treasury funds to make political contributions.158  These firms were added 
to the test list (several are in the financial services industry index as well), 
and the dates they announced their acceptance of the pledge were also 
analyzed.  It is important to note that these firms have pledged only not to 
use corporate treasury funds to make political contributions; they may have 
donated through PACs or intermediaries.159  Furthermore, this list of firms 
does not include many of the firms publicly reported as having provisions 
in their codes of conduct prohibiting political contributions made with 
corporate funds.160  Published in 2007, the Open Windows data cites 
Allegheny Technologies, Avon Products, Black & Decker, Colgate-
 
 157. Dan Eggen, PACs linked to foreign companies legally donate millions to U.S. campaigns, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2010; Eric Lipton et al., Top Corporations Aid U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010; Megan R. Wilson, Not Just News Corp.: Media Companies 
Have Long Made Political Donations, OPENSECRETS.ORG, Aug. 23, 2010; Top Overall Donors, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topcontribs.php?cycle=2004 (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2011). 
 158. See Where do the largest corporations in the United States stand on corporate spending in our 
elections?, BILL DE BLAISO, PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, http:// 
advocate.nyc.gov/corporate-spending (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
 159. Eamon Javers, Morgan Stanley to Curb Corporate Campaign Donations, CNBC, Sept. 27, 
2010. 
 160. FREED & CARROLL, supra note 127, at 15. 
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Palmolive, IBM, Lucent Technologies, OfficeMax, RadioShack, Sara Lee 
and Schlumberger Ltd. as having language in their codes of conduct 
prohibiting political contributions with corporate funds.161  Wells Fargo is 
also cited as prohibiting corporate political contributions on their website, 
but not in their code of conduct.162 
This study uses only those firms who made public pledges in 2010 in 
response to Citizens United.  Interestingly, only three of the firms in the 
Open Windows data signed the New York City Public Advocate’s pledge 
in 2010: Colgate-Palmolive, IBM and Wells Fargo.  The other firms who 
had signed the pledge include: Citigroup, Dell, General Electric, Goldman 
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, Microsoft and Xerox.163 
 The complete list of companies included in the data set is: 
 
 
b.  Data Collection: Market Indices 
 
This study examines market indices to assess the effects of political 
speech on broader market index returns.  In addition to the S&P 500 Index 
(which was used for calculating abnormal returns), specific industry indices 
were examined, particularly those of industries facing the prospect of 
material legislation.  These indices include the Dow Jones U.S. Banks 
 
 161. FREED & CARROLL, supra note 127, at 12. 
 162. Id. at 12–13. 
 163. See Where do the largest corporations in the United States stand on corporate spending in our 
elections?, supra note 158. 
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Index, the Financial Services Index, the Financials Index, the Health Care 
Equipment & Services Index, the Health Care Index, the Insurance Index 
and the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology Index.  This study also examined 
indices of industries not facing the prospect of pending material legislation 
to determine how these indexes performed in relation to the S&P 500 
Index.  These indices include the Broadcasting & Entertainment Index, the 
Construction & Materials Index, the Dow Jones U.S. Aerospace & Defense 
Index, the Food & Beverage Index, the Household Goods & Home 
Construction Index, the Industrial Goods & Services Index, the Industrials 
Index, the Media Index, the Mining Index, the Oil & Gas Index, the 
Personal & Household Goods Index, the Real Estate Index, the Real Estate 
Investment & Services Index, the Retail Index, the Software & Computer 
Services Index, the Technology Index and the Telecommunications Index. 
 
c.  Data Collection: Dates Analyzed in Sample 
 
As part of using the -1, 0, and +1 event data study method, both equity 
and index prices were obtained for the days surrounding the date the 
Supreme Court made it publicly known that it was likely Citizens United 
was going to be overruled (June 29, 2009), the release of Citizens United 
(January 21, 2010), sixty days before the 2010 elections (September 2, 
2010), thirty days before the 2010 elections (October 1, 2010), and the days 
at the 2010 elections (November 2, 2010).  The dates were selected due to 
their relationship to the decision.  For example, as the decision in Citizens 
United overturned certain provisions of the BCRA, including the issue of 
the prohibition of electioneering communications that are made within “60 
days before a general, special, or runoff election . . . or 30 days before a 
primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus . . .,”164 these 
dates (sixty days before the 2010 elections and thirty days before the 2010 
elections) were captured as data points in the event study. 
 
d.  Data Collection: Historical Price Data & Returns 
 
All daily historical closing prices (not dividend or stock split adjusted 
closing prices) for the specific dates aforementioned were found for each 
company and index using Bloomberg.  For each time period, three 
abnormal holding period returns were calculated (using a -1, 0, +1 event 
study method) by subtracting S&P 500 Index returns from the equity return 
for each company.  In addition, abnormal returns for industry-specific 
market indices were found by subtracting S&P 500 Index returns from the 
 
 164. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. §201. 
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industry specific indices. 
To test the significance of the holding period abnormal returns, t-
statistics165 were calculated given by: t = (μ-0) / ((SE)*(√n)), where 
Standard Error of abnormal returns is estimated using  daily time-series 
return data (for the period June 29, 2009 through November 3, 2010) on 
each firm and index.  n is equal to the number of data points used in 
calculating the t-statistic; here it is equal to the three holding period returns 
(-1, 0, +1) that are aggregated and averaged for each date being examined. 
The significance of the t-statistics was assessed using standard z-
distribution166 critical values: 1.64, 1.96 and 2.58 for 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels of significance, respectively. 
 
e.  Contemporary News Events for Analysis 
 
In addition to using cumulative broad market returns (for the S&P 500 
Index) to calculate firm abnormal returns (in order to isolate the effects of 
Citizens United from contemporaneous market events), this study examined 
press reports for evidence of news that was considered to have influenced 
the United States equity markets at the sample dates.  These reports provide 
context and reason for the broad market fluctuations that occurred during 
the dates analyzed.  For example, on June 29, 2009, the date the Supreme 
Court signaled to the marketplace a potential overturn of Citizens United, 
stocks rose despite low trading volume as a result of investor optimism on 
economic recovery.  Financial stocks were particularly up on news that the 
Department of Education revealed details about pricing terms for student 
loan servicing contracts.167  On January 21, 2010, the date the Citizens 
United decision was released, President Obama proposed the Volcker Rule 
and was quoted saying “Banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or 
sponsor hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading operations 
for their own profit, unrelated to serving their customers.”168  The Volcker 
Rule, it was reported, could “potentially disrupt their [the banks] business 
 
 165. A t-statistic is a measure for how extreme a statistical value is. For t-statistics greater than 
benchmark critical values, one can conclude that the variable in question (here, the effects of engaging 
in political speech and the decision in Citizens United), has a significant effect on the dependent 
variable (here, corporation’s market values/stock prices). 
 166. z distribution refers to the normal, symmetrical, continuous probability distribution of event 
outcomes. Even though this paper calculates t-statistics, using the z distribution (in contrast to a t 
distribution) is valid due to the large sample size of data (forty-three firms). 
 167. Stocks Rise on Low Volume As Investors Bet on Recovery, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jun. 29, 2009, 
4:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2009/06/29/stocks-rise-on-low-volume-as-investors-bet-on-
recover/. 
 168. Matt Phillips, Obama Goes Long Volcker, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 3:20 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/01/21/obama-goes-long-volcker/. 
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models and hurt revenue.”169  In early November 2010, markets showed 
optimism in anticipation of the Federal Reserve’s second phase of the 
Quantitative Easing plan.170  Exogenous events are important because while 
they affected the broad market, they may also have had a greater effect on 
individual firms in certain industries (such as financials), resulting in 
positive or negative firm abnormal returns. 
 
3.  Analysis of Hypothesis 1 
 
H1: If public firms engage in corporate political speech, firms’ 
abnormal returns, particularly around the event of the passage of Citizens 
United, would be significantly lower than cumulative returns of market 
indices. 
To determine if the abnormal returns for firms who engage in 
corporate political speech are significantly lower than the cumulative 
returns of market indices, t-statistics for each of the five event dates were 
examined.  The significance findings are presented on the following page 
in Exhibit 1 (see Appendix 1 for actual t-statistics and Appendix 2 for 
detailed daily abnormal returns). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 169. Mark Gongloff, Bank CDS Spreads Widen for JP Morgan, Goldman, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 
21, 2010, 4:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/01/21/bank-cds-spreads-widen-for-
jpmorgan-goldman/. 
 170. Dave Kansas, Markets Cautious, Await Fed Move, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010 6:45 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/11/03/markets-react-cautiously-positive-to-elections-await-fed/. 
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***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
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4.  Hypothesis I Conclusions 
 
On June 29, 2009, the date the Supreme Court made it publicly known 
that they were likely to overrule precedent regarding individual 
corporations’ ability to make political contributions, only two of the 
abnormal returns for any of the forty-three firms in the sample were 
statistically significant.  Both stocks were large banks (Credit Suisse and 
Bank of America) indicating a sector specific, or firm specific event.  In 
each case, the stock prices went up, not down.  Other financial services 
companies (Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase) were up or flat.  At the 
second date examined, the date the decision was announced (January 21, 
2010), thirty-four of the forty-three firms examined in the sample had 
abnormal returns that were not statistically significant.  Of the nine that had 
a statistically significant effect, three of the decliners were large banks, 
subject to the potential disruption to be caused by the imposition of the 
Volker Rule, announced by the President the same day.  Five of the other 
statistically significant returns were positive.  At the third date examined, 
sixty days before the 2010 election, thirty-nine of the forty-three firms 
examined in the sample had abnormal returns that were not statistically 
significant.  The remaining four firms were mixed—with one positive 
return and three negative returns.  At the fourth date examined, thirty days 
before the 2010 election, none of the forty-three firms examined in the 
sample had statistically significant abnormal returns.  At the last date 
examined, the 2010 election, again, none of the abnormal returns for any of 
the forty-three firms were statistically significant. 
The empirical work above allows for the rejection of Hypothesis 1.  
For firms who engaged in corporate political speech, their abnormal returns 
were not statistically significantly lower than cumulative returns of market 
indices, and in fact several of the firms realized significantly positive 
abnormal returns at some of the dates examined. 
Furthermore, if the forty-three firms in the sample are thought of as an 
equally weighted single portfolio, the significance of the portfolio’s 
average abnormal returns at the five event dates provides another 
perspective on the effects of the decision.  The findings are presented on 
the following page in Exhibit 2.  The average abnormal return for the 
portfolio of 43 companies was found for each day during the time period 
(June 26, 2009, through November 2, 2010).  The standard deviation of all 
of these daily average abnormal returns was used in the t-statistic 
calculation. The t-statistics to assess significance were based on the same 
three-day holding period as above for each of the five event dates, using the 
average across three days of the portfolio average abnormal returns.  These 
results on the following page show no material significance. 
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Examining the data relating to average daily returns of individual 
stocks or the overall portfolio (Exhibit 3), there is a similar lack of 
significance.  For example, the average daily holding period return for the 
entire continuous period June 26, 2009, through November 3, 2010, for the 
portfolio is greater than the average daily broader market return during the 
same period.  In fact, 24 of the 43 firms in the portfolio realized average 
returns greater than the S&P 500 Index, and all but three firms experienced 
positive holding period returns during this continuous period (one of these 
firms was BP, who at the time as receiving extraordinarily bad press for an 
offshore drilling disaster in the Gulf of Mexico).  This reinforces the 
statistical findings above, which shows that firms who engage in corporate 
political speech do not realize abnormal returns statistically significantly 
lower than cumulative returns of market indices. 
Exhibit 3 below summarizes the portfolio analogy findings.  The S&P 
500 Index daily average return over the period was 0.083%.  The daily 
average return for the portfolio of forty-three stocks (the average of the 
averages of each different stock) was 0.097%. 
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5 .  Analysis of Hypothesis 2 
 
H2: Abnormal returns for firms that have pledged not to use corporate 
treasury funds to make political contributions should exceed those of the 
S&P 500. 
The second hypothesis whether abnormal returns for firms that 
pledged not to use corporate treasury funds to make political contributions 
exceed those of the broader market.  Before exploring the significance of 
abnormal returns, holding period returns were found for the day that each 
firm announced acceptance of the New York City Public Advocate’s 
Pledge.  Although eleven companies signed the New York City Public 
Advocate’s pledge letter, the exact date for only three of the firms could be 
ascertained.  These were Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase & Co., and 
Morgan Stanley.  The firms signed on August 2, 2010, September 17, 2010, 
and September 27, 2010, respectively.171  It is unclear when the New York 
City Public Advocate updated its website with news of the other 
companies’ pledges. 
 
 
 
The table above illustrates that only Goldman Sachs saw an increase 
in market value on the day they announced their pledge signature.  This 
spike in share price may, however, be attributed to firm-specific events on 
August 2, 2010.  Positive firm-specific market news included a story 
calling Goldman Sach’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein the “Most Beloved CEO on 
Wall Street,” together with reports highlighting the company’s defense of 
its collateral pricing practices with AIG, which were at issue in regulatory 
investigations.172 
Likewise, the drops in share prices of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and 
Morgan Stanley may be attributed to firm-specific events on their pledge 
dates.  On September 17, 2010, JPMorgan Chase & Co. was included in the 
SEC’s list of firms accused of window dressing (a bank practice of 
increasing risk exposure and then removing the exposure at the quarter’s 
 
 171. Javier Hernandez, Politcal Ads Off Limits, Goldman Promises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010; 
Javers, supra note 159; Jia Yang, JPMorgan Chase pledges not to spend cash on election ads, WASH. 
POST VOICES (Sept. 17, 2010, 1:10 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/company-
beat/2010/09/jpmorgan_chase_pledges_not_to.html. 
 172. Douglas McIntyre, Lloyd Blankfein–The Most Beloved CEO On Wall St., 24/7 WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 2, 2010; Goldman Defends Its Collateral Calls to AIG, REUTERS, Aug. 2, 2010. 
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end).173  The SEC also announced a unanimous vote to propose new rules 
that would require public companies to disclose how much risk they carry 
during the quarter.174  On September 27, 2010, Morgan Stanley announced 
that the firm would be implementing a hiring freeze for the remainder of 
2010 as a result of weaker than expected company profits for the third 
quarter, caused by “painfully slow” trading volume.175 
The data for the twelve firms who signed the New York City Public 
Advocate’s pledge illustrates that the pledge and market reaction did not 
offset exogenous events, despite negative company-specific events.  
Exhibit 4 below shows the abnormal holding period returns for the eleven 
firms that signed the New York City Public Advocate’s Pledge and their 
significance (see Appendix 3 for actual t-statistics). 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
Note: Goldman Sachs signed the New York City Public Advocate’s 
pledge in August 2010; JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley signed in 
September 2010.  The distinction between those that pledged and those that 
did not can only be made and analyzed at the later dates (post-Citizens 
United) analyzed in this paper. 
 
 
 
 173. David Weidner, SEC tries on ‘window dressing’ and gets a fit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2010 
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-moves-fast-on-bank-window-dressing-2010-09-17. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Morgan Stanley Imposes Hiring Freeze, Which Could Lead to Layoffs, STREET INSIDER, Sept. 
27, 2010, http://www.streetinsider.com/Insiders+Blog/Morgan+Stanley+Imposes+Hiring+Freeze %2C+ 
Which+Could+Lead+to+Layoffs/5999408.html . 
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6.  Hypothesis 2 Conclusions 
 
As shown above, none of the pledge signers realized a significantly 
positive abnormal return on any of the dates examined in this article.  Any 
positive returns were not statistically significant and did not carry forward, 
and indeed returns diminished as the election drew nearer.  The findings in 
the table above lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 2.  The market did not 
appear to react in any positively significant way to the news of firms 
signing the New York City Public Advocate’s pledge.  In addition, all firms 
who did not sign the pledge did not realize significantly lower abnormal 
returns (shown in Appendix 4), indicating that their performance was not 
worse than the broad market, while the performance of those who signed 
the pledge was no better. 
 
7.  Analysis of Hypothesis 3 
 
H3: Abnormal index returns of industries involved in pending 
government regulation in 2009 and 2010, and therefore likely to engage in 
corporate political speech, are lower than cumulative returns of the broad 
market. 
The third hypothesis explored the performance of industry-specific 
indices that were involved in pending government regulation in 2009 and 
2010.  These indices were examined in relation to the S&P 500 Index and 
indices of industries not involved in pending government regulation during 
the time period.  Industries facing imminent and extensive government 
regulation have a high incentive for, and probability to, engage in political 
speech.176  The indices examined are presented on the following page. 
 
 
 176. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate 
Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 235 (1998) (“[W]hatever the 
government does will inescapably have an immeasurable impact on the health and welfare of the private 
corporation or the world and vice versa.”). 
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In order to determine the significance of the abnormal industry index 
returns, t-statistics were calculated for all of the indices.  The significance 
results are shown below in Exhibit 5.  Appendix 5 shows actual t-statistics 
for all indices.  Appendices 6 and 7 show abnormal holding period returns 
for specific firms in the financial services industry and for specific firms in 
the pharmaceuticals & biotechnology industry, respectively. 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
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8.  Hypothesis III Conclusions 
 
The data above show that at any date only three of the indices 
(mining, telecom, and food & beverages) realized abnormal returns 
significantly lower than the S&P 500 Index.  The majority of the t-statistics 
failed to show significance.  Of the nine events showing a statistical 
significance, six of those were positive.  This allows for the rejection of 
Hypothesis 3.  Industries involved in pending regulation (such as Banks, 
Financial Services, Health Care, etc.) did not realize significantly lower 
abnormal returns than the broader market and in fact received some 
significantly positive abnormal returns.  In addition, industries not involved 
in pending regulation did not realize significantly higher abnormal returns 
than the broader market across the dates.  If these firms were engaging in 
political speech, they were not penalized for it.  Moreover, they do not 
appear to have been adversely affected by the use of PACs or lobbyists. 
 
9.  Empirical Conclusions 
 
The empirical work presented herein provides conclusive evidence for 
the rejection of all three of the following hypotheses: 
If public firms engage in corporate political speech, their abnormal 
returns are not significantly lower than the broad market.  Abnormal 
returns are in fact significantly greater than the broad market at some dates 
examined. 
Abnormal returns for firms that have pledged not to use corporate 
treasury funds to make political contributions do not exceed broad market 
returns.  Abnormal returns for companies who have not made a pledge to 
do so are not significantly lower than broad market returns.  Thus, 
abnormal returns for firms who have pledged are not greater than abnormal 
returns of firms who have not. 
Abnormal index returns of industries more likely to engage in 
corporate political speech are not lower than broad market indices. 
Abnormal index returns of industries less likely to engage in corporate 
political speech are not greater than broad market indices.  Thus, abnormal 
index returns for industries involved in pending government regulation, and 
therefore more likely to engage in corporate political speech, are not lower 
than those of industries not involved in pending government regulation. 
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B.  CITIZENS UNITED DECONSTRUCTED: THE CONDITIONS RELIED ON BY 
THE MAJORITY MAY NOT EXIST 
 
The empirical evidence demonstrates no consistent evidence between 
Citizens United and lower firm value.  What, then, of the policy 
ramifications of the decision?  What if one of the fundamental conditions 
relied upon by the majority of the Court does not exist?  The question is 
particularly relevant for the corporate governance inquiry.  In arguing 
Citizens United, the government and amici set forth the interest of 
shareholders broadly as justification for restrictions on corporate First 
Amendment rights.177  They argued that shareholders should not be 
compelled to fund speech with which they do not agree.178  The opinion by 
Justice Kennedy does not discuss this argument at much length, dismissing 
the theory by giving two reasons in a single paragraph. 
The first reason cited by the Court was that a shareholder protection 
interest would allow a ban on the political speech of even media 
companies, and other corporations formed, at least in part, expressly for 
advocacy purposes.179  The Court unequivocally stated “The First 
Amendment does not allow that power.”180  But what of other corporations?  
For these, the Court reasons that “there is little evidence of abuse that 
cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.’”181  The majority opinion does not specify exactly what it was 
referring to by reference to corporate democracy, although it can be 
assumed that the Court makes reference to traditional shareholder rights to 
vote at annual elections, including director elections, to make shareholder 
resolutions, to seek redress in judicial forums for breaches of fiduciary 
duties, and to pursue any other protections and rights (including the right to 
sell) available to the shareholder. 
The dissenting opinion expands on this topic at more length, 
skeptically stating: 
By “corporate democracy,” presumably the Court means the rights of 
shareholders to vote and to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary 
duty.  In practice, however, many corporate lawyers will tell you that 
“these rights are so limited as to be almost nonexistent,” given the 
internal authority wielded by boards and managers and the expansive 
protections afforded by the business judgment rule.182 
 
 177. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905–11. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794). 
 182. Id. at 978 (Stevens J., dissenting). 
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Further, stated the minority of Justices: 
[T]he problem of dissenting shareholders shows that even if 
electioneering expenditures can advance the political views of some 
members of a corporation, they will often compromise the views of 
others . . . Second, it provides an additional reason, beyond the 
distinctive legal attributes of the corporate form, for doubting that these 
“expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas being 
espoused.”183 
Taken together, all the Justices make reference to the general system of 
corporate democracy—all of the rights possessed by shareholders to vote 
and communicate with each other and with the board via resolutions.  All 
of the Justices saw relevance in referring to corporate governance processes 
as a means of handling a potential shareholder dissent issue.  The 
divergence on the Court was over whether governance protections are 
effective.  This article does not suggest that they are not.  Contrary to the 
view expressed by Justice Stevens in the minority opinion, shareholder 
rights are far from nonexistent.  There is, however, a difference in the 
general processes of corporate governance, and a public company’s ability 
to monitor shareholder sentiment on a candidate by candidate basis. 
The protections afforded shareholders in a public corporation have 
never included the specific, targeted ability of the corporation to capture, 
monitor and use as an input the political beliefs of shareholders.  There are 
several reasons for this.  First, corporations have not had cause to consider 
the issue, let alone attempt to develop methodologies to capture shareholder 
sentiment along political lines.  Even assuming that technologies, systems 
and processes exist to enable shareholder dialogue on political issues, the 
issue of participation in the system presents substantial policy challenges.  
In the context of proxy voting, for example, individual shareholder 
participation in the proxy process remains low.184  There is no assurance 
that any system would capture the views of the majority of shareholders.  
Without such assurance, the risk exits that a minority of motivated or 
“noisy” shareholders could dominate the process.  This could disturb the 
outcome, and lead to the same type of agency problems the reforms seek to 
prevent. 
More significant is the widely-recognized fact about modern corporate 
ownership—institutional investors control almost seventy percent of United 
States publicly traded companies.185  These institutions are primarily acting 
 
 183. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 979 (citing Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, 663). 
 184. See Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495, File No. 
S7-14-10 at 78–86 (discussing retail participation in the proxy process). 
 185. See John C. Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2010, at A25. 
See also Press Release, The Conference Board, U.S. Institutional Investors Continue to Boost 
Ownership of U.S. Corporations (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://www.conference-
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on behalf of the beneficial owners who have economic interest in the 
fortunes of the stock.  Empirical evidence of turnover statistics, or the 
amount by which a fund’s portfolio holdings are changed over the course 
of a year, indicates that the two predominant categories of institutional 
investors in the United States (hedge funds and mutual funds) turn over 
their portfolios frequently.  One estimate of hedge fund turnover is that the 
portfolio turns over three times per year, or a 300% ratio.186  At actively 
managed mutual funds, the turnover statistics are less, but still robust: 
average turnover is as high as 100% per year.187  Pension funds, too, trade 
with frequency.188  It appears that the shareholders of public companies in 
the United States changes completely on almost an annual basis.189 
These challenges undermine the policy recommendations of those 
who would seek to install laws requiring corporations to measure 
shareholder political sentiment.  Both challenges go to whose political 
beliefs are relevant, and whose interests should processes of corporate 
democracy seek to protect.  The institutional shareholders of record?  Or 
the thousands, and in some cases millions, of individual beneficial owners 
known not to the corporation but to the institutional intermediary?  It would 
be unworkable, extremely costly, and ultimately pointless to attempt to 
discern the political beliefs of a class of beneficial owners in a state of flux.  
Whatever the wisdom of such an approach, it is safe to say that large public 
corporations do not, nor do they have the capacity to, engage in an exercise 
to discern shareholder beliefs to enable them to know when the beliefs may 
diverge from other shareholders, the board or senior management. 
Further, in light of the high degree of institutional ownership of equity 
in the securities markets, the corporation does not have the ability to 
directly communicate with large segments of its investor base.  Institutional 
investors sit in between as record holders of stock.190  Suggestions that the 
corporation engage in a process to gain shareholder approval in advance of 
 
board.org/UTILITIES/pressDetail.cfm?press_ID=3046 (indicating that institutional investors held over 
sixty-one percent of United States equities in 2005).  Most estimates assume these numbers will 
continue to rise. 
 186. HENNESSEE GROUP LLC, COMMENTS OF THE HENNESSEE GROUP LLC FOR THE U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ROUNDTABLE ON HEDGE FUNDS (2003), available at 
http://sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-gradante.pdf. 
 187. See Brian Reid & Kimberlee Millar, Mutual Funds and Portfolio Turnover, RESEARCH 
COMMENTARY (Inv. Co. Inst., Nov. 17, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.ici.org/stats/res/rc_v/n2.pdf. 
 188. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 279, 303 (Doreen McBarnett ed. 2007) (pension funds turn over their 
entire portfolios once a year). 
 189. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1227, 1232 (2008) (citing New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) statistics, and concluding “[w]ith annual 
turnover of shares in a public company around 99%, the shareholder base is constantly in flux.”). 
 190. Kahan & Rock, supra note 189, at 1233. 
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political speech would require significant changes to the manner in which 
securities are held and processed.  At a minimum, the institutional investor 
community would be required to develop, install and maintain a system to 
allow for the beneficial owners to vote on political issues.  In this sense, it 
may be fairly said that Justice Kennedy and his brethren in the majority 
were, at least implicitly, relying on underlying conditions which do not 
exist. 
Utilization of the existing proxy system has been suggested.191  This 
approach, while appealing in its directness and simplicity, is difficult to 
envision meeting the asserted objectives and would impose agency and 
transactional costs.  The nature of the annual proxy would make anything 
but a broad expression of direction all but impossible.  First, if a 
shareholder resolution to the effect that shareholders do not favor the use of 
corporate treasury funds in political elections were to be put to a vote and 
carry by a majority, the result would remain precatory and non-binding on 
the board.192  Second, a bylaw purporting to prevent corporate spending 
might face a similar fate as the bylaw mandating expense reimbursement in 
the CA v. AFSCME193 decision.  In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court 
ruled that a bylaw was in contravention of state corporate law because it 
would have removed the ability of the board to exercise its judgment and 
thus its fiduciary duty.194 
To rebut this principal of state law, reformers would propose laws, 
ideally on a federal level, which would override these core state law 
principals.  To date, this is something the United States Congress has been 
reluctant to do.  In fact, in passing the Dodd-Frank Act, deliberate care was 
taken by the Congress to make it clear that the authority granted to the SEC 
to adopt rules regarding mandatory shareholder access to the company 
proxy for director elections did not interfere with or diminish any rights 
under state corporate law.195  To overturn over a century of carefully 
balanced federal-state relations in furtherance of policy which would make 
corporate political speech—a First Amendment right—more costly and 
potentially more difficult is hard to justify on both constitutional and 
corporate law and governance grounds. 
 
 
 191. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 6, at 20. 
 192. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2010). 
 193. See AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d at 227. 
 194. See id. at 240. 
 195. See Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 1041-1048; SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FACILITATING SHAREHOLDER 
DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS, RELEASE NO. 33-9136; (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ 
2010/33-9136.pdf. 
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C.  IRRELEVANCE OF PERSONAL POLITICAL BELIEFS OF SHAREHOLDERS 
 
Even assuming it is theoretically possible to know the political beliefs 
of the corporate shareholder base, of what value is this information?  How 
would the very personal beliefs and internal balancing thought process an 
individual undergoes when casting a vote in a federal election have any 
relevance to the interest of the corporation or to shareholder value?  When 
a person makes a decision to invest in the equity of a particular company, 
he or she is making an economic decision.  In most cases, absent other 
motives, investments are made with the hope and expectation that the value 
of the investment will rise, and that income will flow in the form of 
dividends.  The corporation has the same or similar goals to increase firm 
value and create income.  This is a fundamental purpose of the firm.196  As 
guardians of the corporate welfare, the board of directors has a legally 
enforceable fiduciary duty to pursue this interest, as does corporate 
management.  When the corporation acts in the public realm as a 
corporation, it does, or should, act with the long-term economic interests of 
shareholders in mind.197 
But what of the political realm, and how do natural persons make 
decisions on how and which candidate for whom to vote?  Not surprisingly, 
we the people tend to engage in a more elaborate and nuanced decision-
making process than what is in the long term best interests of our equity 
portfolios.  One study concluded that natural persons base a voting decision 
on the appearance of a candidate’s face.198  The study found that a rapid 
appraisal of the “relative competence” of a candidates face was enough to 
predict the winner in approximately seventy percent of the elections for 
United States Senate and state governors in 2006.199 
Psychologists, academics, economists and political journalists have 
long explored the complicated reasons that motivate individuals to vote in 
political elections.  Some argue that voting is an irrational act since one 
person’s vote has little impact over election outcomes.200  Despite the 
irrationality, evolutionary psychologists note several factors influencing the 
voting behaviors of individuals.  Some vote because it is their civic duty to 
show up at the polls in the first place, but once there, individuals choose 
 
 196. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 677–680 (1986). 
 197. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 
(2009). 
 198. News Release, Princeton Univ., To Determine Election Outcomes, Study Says Snap Judgments 
are Sufficient (Oct. 22, 2007), http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S19/28/30C37/index. 
xml?section=newsreleases. 
 199. See News Release, supra note 198. 
 200. Satoshi Kanazawa, Why Do People Vote? I, PSYCHOLOGYTODAY.COM (Nov. 8, 2009) http:// 
www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-scientific-fundamentalist/200911/why-do-people-vote-i. 
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their favorite candidate in an attempt to influence the election outcome 
even though their one vote is unable to influence the overall election 
outcome.201  Evolutionary psychologists have postulated that the majority 
of the voting population is backward-looking, adaptive learners who vote in 
future elections based on the outcomes of their votes in past elections. One 
formula for the view was expressed as: 
In most Presidential elections, roughly half the people vote for the 
winning candidate, and roughly the other half vote for the losing 
candidate. In other words, about half of the voters have their voting 
reinforced in any given election, and the other half have their voting 
punished . . . So it does appear that people may be backward-looking 
adaptive learners (who respond to the past reinforcement contingencies 
and become more likely to repeat the reinforced response and less 
likely to repeat the punished response), rather than forward-looking 
utility maximizers (who engage in rational behavior designed to bring 
about the desired outcome in the future). It’s not the prospect of 
influencing the future electoral outcome that affects their likelihood of 
voting; it’s the association of their behavior with the desired outcome in 
the past.202 
Further, some political academics agree with the notion that classical 
rational choice explanations of voter participation are inadequate and that 
voting is indeed an irrational act.203  These academics posit that based on 
social psychology and sociology, individuals vote because of the 
importance, or lack thereof, given to voting by an individual’s informal 
social network. 
By contrast, some economists argue that voting is in fact a rational 
decision and that voters are utility maximizers who vote based on their 
individual social preferences.204  They show that individuals have both 
selfish and social ideas which impact their voting behavior; however, it is 
social preferences and the ideal of improving the well-being of others that 
dominates voting patterns.205 
Regardless of whether voting is irrational or not, it is evident that 
individuals consider a variety of factors when deciding which candidate to 
choose in an election. This complex balancing act of assessing the 
importance of various factors is different for each individual.  According to 
a 2008 Voting Behavior project conducted by researchers at the University 
 
 201. See Kanazawa, supra note 200. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Samuel Abrams et al., Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting, BRIT. J. POL. SCI., Dec. 
2010. 
 204. Aaron S. Edlin et al., Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the 
Well-Being of Others (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13562, 2007). 
 205. Edlin et al., supra note 204 
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of Michigan, individuals weigh a variety of factors before making 
decisions.  Besides individual political party identification and general 
ideological dispositions, voters also examine their personal orientations on 
public policy issues, their assessments of current government performance, 
and their evaluations of candidates’ personal traits.206 
Some people consider their personal feelings and emotions—such as 
anger and inspiration—when choosing a political candidate.207  Others vote 
strategically to achieve a political result that they view as being beneficial 
to them.208  Some people vote to protest current government performance 
while some weight their civic obligation to vote in their decision.209  
However, some vote for candidates they find physically attractive.210  In 
addition to physical beauty and gender biases, individuals consider 
politicians’ own personalities and tend to vote for politicians who have 
similar personalities to them.211  Regardless of different viewpoints toward 
what motivates individuals to vote, it is clear that individuals vote in 
complicated ways for a variety of reasons.  Individuals factor in many 
elements when electing a political candidate to office and their decision is 
rarely—if ever—based on only one factor. 
How natural persons arrive at political decisions is an alchemical 
process, under which many factors are balanced in arriving at a conclusion.  
Public corporations, at the corporate level, cannot engage in this balance.  
On the other hand, the individual directors of a company may, as can the 
managers over which the directors have oversight responsibilities.  
However, these political beliefs are the personal ones of the individual, not 
of the corporation.  One Court succinctly put it: “[w]hile corporate 
democracy is a pertinent concept, a corporation is not a New England town 
meeting; directors, not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation, subject however to a fiduciary 
obligation.”212 
Why would the political beliefs of an individual shareholder as to the 
death penalty, abortion, foreign policy or any of the dozens of issues at play 
in the political arena be of any relevance to the corporation’s primary 
 
 206. Charles Prysby and Carmine Scavo, Voting Behavior, VOTING BEHAVIOR: THE 2008 
ELECTION, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/SETUPS2008/voting.jsp (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
 207. John Feehery, Why people vote, THE HILL (March 4, 2011) http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/campaign/126971-why-people-vote. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See News Release, supra note 198. 
 211. G. V. Caprara et al., When Likeness Goes with Liking: The Case of Political Preference, 28 
POL. PSYCH. 609, 627 (2007). 
 212. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., CIV. A. NOS. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at 
n.14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). 
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purpose of long-term growth?  In short, historically they have not been, and 
nothing in the Court’s decision in Citizens United or extant policy factors 
should alter this fact.  What is important to consider is that corporate 
political speech in no way suppresses or prevents the individual expression 
of political speech.  Investment in the United States equity markets in no 
way chills the right to expression of the individual.  Unlike corporate 
waste, in which the assets of the corporation are frittered away to the 
financial detriment of the residual claimants, speech is just that, speech. 
Indeed, the associative interests of individuals are remote.  It is a leap 
of faith to believe that the position taken by a corporation in political 
speech could rationally be attributed to a minority shareholder.  This 
associative risk is made more diffuse due to the existence of the 
institutional intermediary as shareholder of record positioned between the 
corporation and the beneficial owner.  If a shareholder is conflicted by 
political speech, they are free to take the money they make from the stock 
and start a PAC in opposition to the cause.  Given the choice between a 
successful growing company supporting a candidate with whom the 
shareholder has a disagreement and a company whose stock is sinking but 
one who may back the same candidate, the rational investor would choose 
the company whose stock is on the rise.  This is where the corporate duty 
ends and where the investors’ interests, as an investor in the equity capital 
markets, ends as well. 
If existing duties of care, loyalty and its by-product good faith are not 
sufficient to prevent a director from ignoring his or her fiduciary 
responsibilities to the corporation and its shareholders in the political 
speech context, then we cannot rely on those duties to protect corporate and 
shareholder interests in any of the other myriad situations in which public 
companies act.  Were this to be the case, the corporate form would be 
unworkable, inefficient and dysfunctional.  If the shareholders interest does 
not end at the point of economic advancement, then the corporate form is 
hostage to a myriad of individual special interests.  Not only would this 
stifle speech, but corporate risk taking would suffer in its wake. 
 
D.  WHAT A CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION ON CORPORATE POLITICAL 
SPEECH MIGHT LOOK LIKE 
 
After the decision in Citizens United, at least two separate bills in 
Congress and a number of state legislative acts were introduced seeking to 
reign in the freedoms recognized by the Supreme Court.213  The 
 
 213. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY: EMERGING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES 4 (2010). 
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DISCLOSE Act214 passed the House of Representatives, but not the Senate.  
It would add to the disclosure requirements of the BCRA by requiring that 
the head of an organization engaging in political speech, the CEO for 
example, to appear in the advertisement and expressly support its message, 
in the manner of political advertisements.215  In addition, the Shareholder 
Protection Act of 2010216 would purport to require express shareholder 
approval prior to corporate political expenditures.217 
Even though the prospect for legislative action is uncertain, and 
maybe even remote, they demonstrate a degree of mistrust in corporate 
speech.  The rationale set forth in Citizens United hints at how future 
proposals might look.  These possibilities include: removing the existing 
limits on direct contributions to political candidates; redrawing the 
prohibition against political speech to apply only to for-profit corporations 
(perhaps only of a certain size) and not nonprofits; adding additional 
disclosure requirements; and making certain government benefits 
conditional upon a corporation not making political expenditures.218 
A narrowly crafted prohibition applying only to public companies of a 
certain size may present the Court with a factual scenario under which 
Citizens United could be distinguished.  That constitutional challenges 
would remain is a given; the broad rationale of the Court in Citizens United 
may leave reformers little room in which to work.  If we look at corporate 
political speech as speech itself, we focus on the importance of the ideas 
expressed in the speech, and not who expressed those ideas.  Further, by 
separating out the nature and identity of the speaker (corporation versus 
natural person) as the Court itself did, and by further viewing the nature of 
the speech (political) as either not a negative interest for the analysis or 
more likely an area requiring heightened protection, political speech 
becomes like a metaphorical bullet, shot into the marketplace, striking 
whatever it may.  Its effect is completely independent of the person firing 
the gun—the bullet hits or misses in the same manner whether it was fired 
by the local sheriff or the black-hatted outlaw.  And so it is with speech.  
 
 214. Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act, H.R. 5175, 111th 
Cong. (2010). 
 215. See Id. These legislative efforts took place prior to the November 2010 elections, in which the 
House of Representatives switched from a Democratic to a Republican majority, and the Democratic 
majority in the Senate was narrowed but not overturned. What effect these changes, if any, may have on 
these and any further legislation would be speculative, but in general, the prospects for a bill rolling 
back Citizens United may have been diminished in a Republican-controlled House of Representatives 
given that the DISCLOSE Act passed the House in a 219-206 vote, largely along party lines.  See 
Office of the Clerk, United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 391 (Jun. 
24, 2010), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll391.xml. 
 216. Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 217. Id. at § 2(4). 
 218. Kathleen Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 167 (2010). 
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The idea either hits or misses its target without regard for the identity of the 
creator.  This theory is a roadblock to a distinction based on differentiation 
of public companies, but might not be insurmountable.  This depends on 
the extent to which the importance of corporate governance was to the 
majority opinion. 
This article has argued that the way the Court placed reliance on the 
protections of shareholder democracy as a means to specifically address the 
interests of dissenting or minority shareholders was based on the (faulty) 
assumption that those shareholder political beliefs can be measured.  If we 
remove that pillar of the Court’s theory as a compelling government 
interest, can we envision a law which would protect minority shareholders 
and corporations alike?  Perhaps.  It is doubtful that any law which 
completely eliminates the right of corporations to speak can be squared 
with Citizens United, and, it seems unlikely the Court would choose to 
overrule Citizens United given the current composition of the Supreme 
Court. 
A constitutionally acceptable prohibition would have to be one 
fashioned differently.  Suppose, then, a new BCRA restriction against 
independent political expenditures within thirty days of a primary and sixty 
days of a general election that by its terms does not apply to: (1) nonprofit 
institutions whose primary purpose is advocacy; (2) media companies; (3) 
limited liability companies established for advocacy purposes; and (4) for-
profit public companies with over a certain amount of registered 
shareholders (a target number like 500 is consistent with SEC registration 
rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933).  Would such a law 
survive a constitutional challenge like the one faced in Citizens United and 
in the aftermath of that holding? 
This hypothetical law starts with the theory that protecting the 
political interests of all, some or a majority of shareholders in a public 
corporation is a compelling state interest upon which a restraint on free 
speech could be based.  If so, carving out public companies based on 
certain characteristics serves to meet that interest.  The law could be drafted 
in such a way as to allow even larger corporations to apply for an 
exemption from the absolute prohibition upon applying to the FEC and 
demonstrating that sufficient internal policies, procedures and controls exist 
to allow the corporation to understand the preferences of its shareholders 
by resolution or proxy vote.  Investors in the types of corporations exempt 
from the rule under this approach would either invest in the corporation 
with the understanding that political speech was an element of the business 
model or could in theory make their preferences known in the normal 
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course of board-shareholder communications.  The Supreme Court has 
drawn similar distinctions before.219  There would, under this proposal, be 
no need to reform the corporate governance model itself. 
However, to the extent that the Court did not look at the capture and 
accommodation of shareholder political preferences to be a compelling 
interest, laws designed along the lines of the proposed rule making have a 
less chance of passing the Citizens United test.  On the one hand, if the 
Court has signaled that the First Amendment truly protects the speech 
itself, regardless of the nature of the speaker, then prohibitions based on 
classification are on unsteady ground.  Reformers would have to search for 
classifications not based on the corporate form, but on other policy grounds 
justifying a ban which would encompass corporate speech.  Indeed, a 
prohibition against foreign corporate speech would be suspect under the 
aegis of the nonclassification doctrine.  Classifications based on other 
characteristics of the corporate form, such as the aggregate of wealth, could 
very well cover natural persons in addition to corporations.  Any restriction 
on the free speech rights of natural persons to express opinions in political 
contests would be among the hardest constitutional challenges to meet.  
And on the other, it is unclear whether the majority of the Supreme Court 
would, if put to the test, consider the personal political beliefs of a 
shareholder in a modern for-profit corporation to be a compelling interest 
balanced against freedom of speech. 
 
V.  THE CORPORATE RIGHT TO SPEAK OUTWEIGHS 
DERIVATIVE SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS 
 
A. SHAREHOLDER POLITICAL BELIEFS OUTWEIGHED BY NEED FOR 
CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH 
 
Whatever rights a shareholder has to his or her own political beliefs, 
those beliefs are personal to the individual.  The fact that a corporation in 
which he or she has invested also has political rights does not in any way 
diminish or restrict the free expression of those rights.  Another more 
significant problem is the one of entanglement.  Given the right to speak, 
and the legitimate interest a corporation has in furthering its economic 
interests in engaging in electioneering political speech, how can the 
government, let alone a diffuse and ever-shifting collection of beneficial 
shareholders, distinguish between corporate speech which serves an 
 
 219. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 263–264 (1986) (nonprofit corporations 
organized to disseminate ideas given special treatment); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241 (1974) (for-profit media corporations similar). 
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economic purpose and corporate speech which may not?  If the First 
Amendment is about anything, it is about allowing a speaker free 
expression, regardless of the popularity, content or nature of the views 
expressed.  The government is restricted from placing itself in the role of 
arbiter, serving as a gatekeeper, allowing some expression but not others.  
The nature of the shareholder in a public for-profit corporation, likely to be 
an intermediary holding a position for many beneficial owners, prevents 
such an exercise from being possible, were it even to be desired.  It is not 
desirable for the very reason the corporate form was designed, and the 
reason the corporate structure had worked so well—shareholders are not in 
a position to know the nonpublic details of the corporation and have rightly 
delegated the daily affairs of the corporation to management, as overseen 
by a board of directors.  For that reason, the actors best suited to make the 
determination of what speech is appropriate for the corporation to make are 
the same actors charged with the overall job of wealth building— 
management and the board.  Whose interests will be served if corporations 
are prevented from acting in what they believe to be their best economic 
interests by a shareholder acting on noneconomic, and probably personal, 
beliefs? 
And further, the compelling shareholder argument is based on the 
proposition that shareholders, even a minority of shareholders at that, 
“own” the corporate treasury.  They do not.  Shareholders own shares of 
stock in the corporation, which ownership entitles the shareholders to 
specific rights enumerated in state corporate law statutes and judicial 
opinions.  These rights are akin to ownership rights, but share ownership by 
itself does not entitle the security holder to all of the rights (and 
obligations, like unlimited liability) of full legal ownership.  Shareholders 
are not entitled to seize assets of the corporation, without judicial or other 
contractual permission, and use the assets for their own purposes.  The 
corporation, while not a natural person, remains a legal entity for the 
purposes of property ownership rights, legal liability and the First 
Amendment.  The corporation, in its own capacity, then owns the corporate 
treasury.  Shareholders are not “compelled to fund corporate political 
speech”220 in any direct sense.  While it is true that funds in the corporate 
treasury are available to be distributed to shareholders in the form of 
dividends, decision making with respect to dividends is not a normal 
minority shareholder right. 
 
 
 
 
 220. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010). 
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B.  IF THE CONDITIONS CITED BY THE COURT DO NOT EXIST,  
 DODD-FRANK, SEC RULEMAKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT SHAREHOLDERS 
 
We are in the midst of the shareholder rights era.221  The “significantly 
increased ability of shareholders to influence corporate conduct”222 is a new 
dynamic in the allocation of roles and responsibilities among the board, 
management and shareholders.  When we examine Citizens United, we 
observe the recognition of a corporate right bestowed in the environment of 
this shareholder assention. 
We are light years from the world in which the rights of shareholders 
are “practically nonexistent.”  CEO and board turnover are increasing.  
Executive compensation schemes are being revised with direct shareholder 
input.  Shareholder access to the company proxy, authorized by Congress 
and enabled by an SEC rule (currently subject to a court challenge), will, if 
adopted, authorize a new, direct channel by which shareholders can 
dialogue directly with other shareholders and the board.  The cumulative 
effect of these changes has made corporations and boards more responsive 
to their shareholders.  All of these conditions, not cited by the majority of 
the Supreme Court in the Citizens United opinion, serve to significantly 
increase the protection of shareholder rights generally more than at any 
time in our history.  Regarding specific protections targeted at political 
speech, this article has argued for the irrelevance of individual shareholder 
political preferences to the corporate purpose, the agency and expense 
barriers to implementing such a system, and the questionable benefits of 
such an approach given the nature of communication in the wireless, 
internet age. 
 
C.  BOARDS, INCENTIVES AND MANAGING RISK 
 
The existence of a powerful class of institutional intermediaries as 
investors, equipped with an increasingly potent and varied tool box with 
which to exert their ownership interests provides significant support for the 
policy decision underlying Citizens United.  At the same time, 
compositional changes in the boards of directors of public companies have 
increased the independence of the board from the CEO and management, 
and have facilitated the ability of a board to act as an effective monitor on 
behalf shareholders.  Beginning with Sarbanes-Oxley and audit 
 
 221. See Strine, supra note 17. 
 222. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
(2010), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/CCGReport.pdf. 
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committees, the listing standards of the securities exchanges, and Dodd-
Frank mandates for the independence of the compensation committee, the 
number of inside directors on public company boards is shrinking.223  The 
independence of directors from management, together with the proper 
incentives and alignment of interests with shareholders through director 
equity ownership, is a hallmark of sound corporate governance.224 
Coupled with these compositional and environmental changes is the 
growing expectation, and in many instances a regulatory requirement, for 
the board to assume direct oversight of risk management policies and 
practices.  Political, or reputational, risk may be one of the more potent 
risks a board must guard against.  Companies including BP, Goldman 
Sachs, and Toyota have seen not only their stock prices, but the franchise 
itself, damaged by reputational, regulatory and political harms.  In the case 
of Goldman Sachs, the company settled a fraud case with the SEC 
regarding the structuring of mortgage derivatives for a record $550 million 
after months of maintaining their innocence in the press and in testimony 
before Congress.225  After the settlement, Goldman Sachs issued a lengthy 
business practices report226 in which the firm set forth to disclose numerous 
changes to organizational structure, business practices and disclosure 
designed to provide more transparency and in the hopes of reclaiming lost 
confidence from their clients, the regulators, investors and the markets.227  
Even after this, Goldman Sachs was considered to have stumbled when 
they were forced to cancel United States investor participation in the 
widely reported private placement of Facebook.228 
The solution to proper oversight of the political speech of the 
corporation is not to divest the board of its power and turn direct 
responsibility to shareholders—it is to empower the board of directors.  
The board of a public company, in compliance with the listing standards of 
 
 223. See Vidhan Goyal, Corporate Board Structures, Q FINANCE (2010), available at 
http://www.qfinance.com/contentFiles/QF02/g1xtn5q6/12/4/corporate-board-structures.pdf. 
 224. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management 
Turnover, 54 BUS. LAW. 885, 887–88 (1999). 
 225. See Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges 
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2010/2010-123.htm. 
 226. GOLDMAN SACHS, REPORT OF THE BUSINESS STANDARDS COMMITTEE (2011), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/GoldmanBSC.pdf. 
 227. In its report, Goldman Sachs stresses its dedication to “complying fully with the letter and 
spirit of the laws, rules and ethical principles that govern [it],” and outlines its intentions to do so by 
improving “spanning client service, conflicts and business selection, structured products, transparency 
and disclosure, committee governance, training and professional development and employee evaluation 
and incentives.” REPORT OF THE BUSINESS STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 226, at 1. 
 228. See Liz Rappaport, Goldman Limits Facebook Deal to Non-US Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703396604576087941210274036.html. 
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the exchange on which the firm’s stock is registered, and whose members 
are comprised of a substantial majority of independent directors, have the 
necessary objectivity and the incentive to exercise that independence to 
oversee the political speech of the corporation.  Whether a separate 
committee would be established, or whether the process is overseen by an 
existing risk, audit or nominating and governance committee is a matter for 
internal firm tailoring and private ordering.  Likewise, the nature and level 
of discourse and communication made to shareholders through the 
company proxy or other means would be determined by the standards set 
by the disclosure rules of the federal government through SEC and FEC 
rules and through marketplace and shareholder expectations and demands.  
An independent board of directors, subject to the expanded oversight 
powers of the modern shareholder should have the explicit authority, 
subject to state law fiduciary duties, to exercise the corporate First 
Amendment right to speech in the political electoral context. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Whether corporations have all of the same constitutional rights, and in 
the same degree, as natural persons is an unsettled question.  In Citizens 
United, the Supreme Court made it clear that corporations are entitled to 
the protections of the First Amendment.  Using an event study 
methodology, this article has analyzed whether the political speech rights 
enabled by the decision have a negative effect on firm values.  The good 
news for public corporations and their shareholders is that the data reflected 
no negative effect upon a firm’s engagement in political speech.  On the 
other hand, there is no observable benefit to or effect on those firms that 
have publicly declared not to use corporate funds to engage in political 
speech.  Corporate political speech must be analyzed in the context of the 
environment in which the corporation exists, and by the guiding principle 
of long-term shareholder wealth. 
In the post-Dodd-Frank era of heightened shareholder empowerment, 
the modern corporation and its board of directors is on the proverbial 
shareholder’s speed dial.  Proxy access, the use of majority voting and the 
elimination of broker votes in uncontested shareholder elections have 
further increased the importance of the voting process and the influence of 
the shareholder.  Concurrently, the regulatory environment in which 
corporations must compete is complex, costly and burdensome.  Armed 
with the right to speak, and to possibly influence the political environment 
from which regulations flow, corporations have a responsibility to consider 
political speech as a legitimate means to advance their economic goals.  
Considerations of the personal political beliefs of shareholders (and other 
COFFIN-CITIZENS UNITED-09-23-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  3:49 PM 
166 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 8:1 
stakeholders like customers) are largely irrelevant for the corporate 
welfare, and so long as the corporation is pursuing its legitimate goals in 
good faith, those interests must be outweighed by the interests of the 
corporation. 
Finally, shareholders should not be given explicit authority to vote on 
or approve corporate speech.  Given the empirical findings herein, there is 
no evidence warranting a large scale revision to the corporate governance 
model that such a reform would entail.  Instead, policy makers, including 
judges, state corporate law and model codes, should clarify that the 
independent members of a board of directors who are subject to an open 
election process should have the responsibility to oversee corporate 
political speech in the same manner and with the fiduciary responsibilities 
with which boards oversee other variations of corporate risk. 
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Appendix 1: T-Statistics for All Firm Abnormal Returns (Three Day 
Holding Period) 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
COFFIN-CITIZENS UNITED-09-23-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2011  3:49 PM 
168 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 8:1 
Appendix 2: Abnormal Holding Period Returns for All Firms 
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Appendix 3: T-Statistics for Firm Abnormal Returns (Three Day 
Abnormal Holding Period Returns): Firms That Pledged Not to Make 
Political Contributions with Corporate Treasury Funds 
 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
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Appendix 4: CAR Three-Day Holding Period Returns for Firms That 
Did Not Sign NYC Public Advocate Pledge 
 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
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Appendix 5: T-Statistics for Index Abnormal Returns (Three Day 
Abnormal Holding Period Returns) 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
 
 
Appendix 6: CAR Three Day Holding Period Returns for Firms in the 
Financial Services Industry 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
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Appendix 7: CAR Three Day Holding Period Returns for Firms in the 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology Industry 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively, two-tailed tests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
